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INTRODUCTION 
The European Union’s institutions and Member States have 
increasingly embraced liberal lawyer regulation during the past 
few decades.1 Many restrictions on the legal profession have 
disappeared or become more permissive, especially those 
governing where and with whom lawyers may practice.2 This has 
allowed the growth of multijurisdictional practice (“MJP”), 
which refers to a lawyer’s temporary or permanent work done 
outside of the jurisdiction where he originally obtained his 
qualification to practice law.3 Additionally, some Member States 
                                                                                                             
1. See PANTEIA, EVALUATION OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE FREE MOVEMENT 
OF LAWYERS, FINAL REPORT 5 (2012) [hereinafter EU REPORT] (describing the Lawyers’ 
Services Directive, the Lawyers’ Establishment Directive, and the Diploma Recognition 
Directive in relation to the free movement of lawyers); see also Julian Lonbay, Assessing 
the European Market for Legal Services: Developments in the Free Movement of Lawyers in the 
European Union, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1629, 1632–44 (2011) (describing how EU 
legislation has increased lawyer mobility since the 1970s). 
2. EU REPORT, supra note 1, at 10 (describing recent Member State reforms 
eliminating restrictions on partnerships between lawyers and non-lawyers); see Lonbay, 
supra note 1, at 1629–30 (explaining that the growth of interstate legal practice in the 
European Union is widely acknowledged).  
3 . ABA Comm’n on Multijurisdictional Practice, ABA Commission on 
Multijurisdictional Practice Introduction and Overview 5 (Aug. 2002) [hereinafter 2002 
MJP Report] (stating that multijurisdictional practice “describes the legal work of a 
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have eliminated prohibitions on alternative legal practice 
structures (“ALPS”)—groups of lawyers where non-lawyers may 
own, manage, or work for the practice—allowing lawyers to 
practice with other professionals.4 
This liberalization has dramatically impacted the practice of 
law throughout the European Union.5 The European Union has 
seen an explosion of multi-office legal firms since the 1990s. For 
example, London-based Clifford Chance grew from twelve to 
thirty-three offices between 1987 and 2002.6 Furthermore, some 
law firms have transformed into multidisciplinary practices 
(“MDPs”)—one-stop, full-service practices providing consumers 
with legal, accounting, consulting, and other services.7  
                                                                                                             
lawyer in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is not admitted to practice law”); ABA 
Comm’n on Multijurisdictional Practice, ABA Commission on Multijurisdictional 
Practice Report 201B to the House of Delegates 1 (Aug. 2002) [hereinafter Report 
201B] (explaining that Model Rule 5.5 covers lawyers who are practicing outside the 
jurisdiction where they are qualified). 
4. See Paul D. Paton, Globalization, Core Values, and Reviving the MDP Debate in 
America, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2193, 2197 (2010) (describing the specific authorization 
for ALPS the 2007 Legal Services Act in the UK provides); ABA Comm’n on Ethics 
20/20, ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 Discussion Paper on Alternative Law Practice 
Structures 1 (Dec. 2, 2011) [hereinafter December ALPS Paper] (explaining the trend 
among countries worldwide to begin permitting ALPS, such as firms with non-lawyer 
owners). 
5. See EU REPORT, supra note 1, at 8 (discussing the impact of liberalization on 
client experience and economics); Lonbay, supra note 1, at 1631 (explaining that 
increased “stratification of the legal professions . . . is likely to become more 
pronounced as the barriers to increased inter-disciplinary practice decrease at the 
national level”). 
6. See Lonbay, supra note 1, at 1630 (explaining the widespread growth of large, 
multi-office law firms); U.N. Conf. on Trade and Dev., World Investment Report 2004: 
The Shift Towards Services 326 tbl. A.III.6, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2004, U.N. Sales 
No. E.04.II.D.33 (2004) (stating that Clifford Chance had grown to 33 offices in 24 
countries in 2002). 
7. See Lonbay, supra note 1, at 1631 (describing new legislation that “will allow 
multi-disciplinary practice in England and Wales in the form of alternate business 
structures”). See generally Laurel S. Terry, German MDPs: Lessons to Learn, 84 MINN. L. 
REV. 1547 (2000) (analyzing the implementation of MDPs in Germany, where some 
forms of partnerships with non-lawyers have been permitted since the early 1990s). 
Multidisciplinary practices (“MDPs”) are a type of alternative legal practice structures 
(“ALPS”) where non-lawyers practice their profession in the same firm with lawyers, 
and in some cases may also have an ownership interest. Paton, supra note 4, at 2200 
(stating that an MDP is “an integrated entity that provides legal services as one of 
several professional services offerings through a single firm or provider”). 
2014] LEARNING FROM EU LIBERALIZATION 1579 
As a result, lawyers’ roles and identities, like the size and 
operations of law firms, are in a state of flux. 8  European 
attorneys are now more likely to specialize, and those who 
engage in multijurisdictional practice increasingly choose their 
physical location for reasons other than nationality; lawyers 
moving in the Maas-Rhin region of Belgium, Germany, and the 
Netherlands, for example, are responding to increased need for 
legal services in certain specialties.9 In contrast, the US legal 
profession remains subject to state-by-state regulation that is 
much more restrictive than EU rules.10 Lawyers in the United 
States may engage in MJP only in certain limited situations, and 
ALPS are prohibited throughout the United States.11 
The driving forces behind reform and the practical effects 
felt throughout the European Union and the world have 
inspired many US lawyers to advocate for similar changes to US 
lawyer regulation.12 Many other attorneys, however, unite in 
opposition to allowing MJP and ALPS due to factors such as the 
                                                                                                             
8. See Lonbay, supra note 1, at 1630–31 (explaining the specialization resulting 
from large law firms); Stephen Gillers, A Profession: If You Can Keep It: How Information 
Technology and Fading Borders Are Reshaping the Law Marketplace and What We Should Do 
About It, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 953, 993 (2012) (describing specialization as one of the 
profession’s recent developments). 
9. Lonbay, supra note 1, at 1632 (“[T]he increasing de facto specialization of parts 
of the legal professions will increase pressure on entry regimes to permit ultra-
specialized and experienced practitioners access to the growing market for such 
services.”); EU REPORT, supra note 1, at 177 (explaining that most lawyers establishing 
practices away from home are corporate or international lawyers moving with their 
clients); id. at 179 (highlighting the Maas-Rhin region as an area where high lawyer 
mobility results from growing numbers of multijurisdictional matters in specific 
sectors). 
10. Roger J. Goebel, The Liberalization of Interstate Practice in the European Union: 
Lessons for the United States?, 34 INT’L LAW. 307, 318 (2000) (explaining that US lawyers 
are regulated by state laws and court rules); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
PREFACE (“[The ABA] provide[s] leadership in legal ethics and professional 
responsibility through the adoption of professional standards that serve as models of 
the regulatory law governing the legal profession.”). 
11. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (providing several specific 
situations where a lawyer may engage in multijurisdictional practice (“MJP”), and 
outlawing it in all other circumstances); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 
(prohibiting fee sharing between lawyers and non-lawyers). 
12. Eli Wald, Federalizing Legal Ethics, Nationalizing Law Practice, and the Future of 
the American Legal Profession in a Global Age, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 489, 493 (2011) 
(calling for reform that “addresses pressing client needs ignored by the current state-
based approach”); Gillers, supra note 8, at 971 (arguing that the traditional US 
regulatory model is insufficient to regulate the modern profession). 
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tradition of self-regulation among US lawyers and the 
importance of federalism in the United States.13 This anti-reform 
movement views changes to the US regulatory framework for 
lawyers as a threat to the profession’s core values.14 
The clash of these opposing ideologies has brought 
widespread attention to debates over US implementation of MJP 
and ALPS.15 During the last two decades, the American Bar 
Association (“ABA”) has devoted great time and effort to 
studying these topics and accordingly amended its Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct (the “Model Rules”).16 Many advocates 
of reform consider these changes insufficient, while opposing 
attorneys believe the rules should remain stringent.17 These two 
views diverge on many points, but both seek regulation that 
properly balances protecting ethical values and advancing the 
profession.18 
                                                                                                             
13. See generally Gillers, supra note 8 (explaining some US lawyers’ resistance to 
reform); Ted Schneyer, “Professionalism” as Pathology: The ABA’s Latest Policy Debate on 
Non-Lawyer Ownership of Law Practice Entities, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 75 (2012) 
(providing an analysis of how the arguments against ALPS prevented their 
implementation in the United States). 
14 . See ABA Ctr. for Prof’l Responsibility, Recommendation 10F (2000), 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/mdp-report1Of.html [hereinafter Recommendation 
1OF] (“The sharing of legal fees with non-lawyers and the ownership and control of 
the practice of law by nonlawyers are inconsistent with the core values of the legal 
profession.”). See generally Paton, supra note 4 (describing how US lawyers’ adherence 
to the belief that core values cannot survive reform has halted progress). 
15. Wald, supra note 12, at 490 (“Complaints about the legal profession’s self-
regulation abound.”); ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, ABA Commission on Ethics 
20/20 Preliminary Issues Outline 6 (Nov. 19, 2009) [hereinafter Ethics 20/20 
Preliminary Outline] (stating that the ALPS debate resounds with US “lawyers and law 
firms of all sizes”). 
16. See generally Paton, supra note 4, at 2193 (explaining that the ABA’s 2000 
decision not to implement ALPS “followed a nearly three-year investigation and 
rancorous debate within the ABA”); see also Wald, supra note 12, at 513–14 (stating that 
the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 studied “the impact of nationalization and 
globalization on law practice, contemplating several rule revisions meant to address the 
growing gap between practice realities and the state-based regulatory approach”). 
17. Wald, supra note 12, at 491 (finding that many attorneys consider the Model 
Rules to be outdated); Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinary 
Practice: Their Derivation, Their Development, and Some Implications for the Core Values 
Debate, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1115, 1144–45 (2000) (discussing the view that adherence to 
traditional regulations is necessary for sustaining ethical legal practice). 
18. Paton, supra note 4, at 2242 (explaining the belief that treating law as a 
business does not have to come at the expense of core values); Gillers, supra note 8, at 
998 (“[T]he cry we must heed is not for less regulation of the profession, but rather for 
new regulation of the burgeoning ways that legal services are sold.”). 
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Part I of this Note discusses the historical and legal 
background of lawyer regulations in the European Union and 
the United States, and summarizes the current regulatory 
climates. Part II analyzes the arguments for and against relaxing 
restrictions on MJP and ALPS in the United States. Finally, Part 
III suggests amending the Model Rules to help the US legal 
profession function more efficiently and accurately reflect 
changes in the modern world. 
I. LAWYER REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND 
THE UNITED STATES 
The current divergence between the EU and US systems for 
regulating lawyers is largely a result of vast differences in 
development.19 Part I.A of this Note discusses the background of 
EU professional responsibility rules, liberal movement between 
EU Member States, and the relation to competition law in the 
European Union. It then describes the corresponding US 
approach to legal regulation. Part I.B describes the modern state 
of professional regulation in the European Union and the 
United States. 
A. Development of the EU and US Frameworks for Regulating the Legal 
Profession 
In the European Union and the United States, lawyer 
regulation evolved over time as legislative action and judicial 
interpretation expanded foundational principles.20 Part I.A.1 of 
this Note discusses the development of the EU system as it 
relates to MJP and ALPS. Part I.A.2 describes the US framework 
for lawyer regulation and the evolution of US debates about MJP 
and ALPS. 
                                                                                                             
19. Goebel, supra note 10, at 307 (explaining that, since the 1970s, EU lawyers 
have enjoyed more liberal practice rights than US lawyers); Lonbay, supra note 1, at 
1630 (stating that US states created restrictions on access to the bar without 
consideration of the effect on the profession). 
20 . Goebel, supra note 10, at 307 (explaining that legislation and judicial 
decisions have expanded lawyers’ practice rights since the 1970s); Geoffrey C. Hazard, 
Jr., State Supreme Court Regulatory Authority over the Legal Profession, 72 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1177, 1178 (1997) (discussing “various intrusions” by the federal government and 
the US Supreme Court on state regulation of lawyers during the past several decades). 
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1. Implementing Liberal Lawyer Regulation in the European 
Union through Interpretation and Application of the Treaty 
The Lisbon Treaty on European Union and its accessory, 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (the 
“Treaty”) act as the EU’s constitution, governing the community 
formed by its Member States.21 The Treaty strives to create a 
sense of unity throughout Europe, and to integrate the separate 
nations to benefit all Europeans.22 To that end, it calls for an 
“internal market” to improve and unite Europe.23 The internal 
market is founded on the free movement of people, goods, 
services, and capital—which the Treaty seeks to facilitate by 
removing barriers to trade. 24  The provisions relevant to 
regulating professionals, including attorneys, are those related 
to the free movement of services and freedom of 
establishment.25 
These two freedoms combine to form the basis for EU 
lawyer regulation, whereby a lawyer can practice throughout the 
European Union, with limited restrictions imposed by where the 
                                                                                                             
21. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, 2012 O.J. C 326/47 [hereinafter TFEU] (providing the basis of EU law); Jean-
Claude Piris, Does the European Union Have a Constitution? Does it Need One?, 24 EUR. L. 
REV. 557 (1997) (concluding that the EU’s treaties form a “constitutional system”). 
22. TFEU, supra note 21, preamble, at 49 (stating that the goals of the Treaty are to 
“lay the foundations of an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe” and take 
“common action to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe”); GEORGE A. BERMANN, 
ROGER J. GOEBEL, WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ELEANOR M. FOX, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
EUROPEAN UNION LAW 7 (2d ed. 2002) (explaining that the Treaty seeks to develop 
economic harmonization). 
23. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2012 O.J. C 326/13, 
art. 3(3), at 17 [hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon] (“The Union shall establish an internal 
market.”); One Market Without Borders, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/pol/singl/index_
en.htm (last visited May 15, 2014) (providing a detailed analysis of the internal market 
concept). 
24. CATHERINE BARNARD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EU: THE FOUR FREEDOMS 
10 (8th ed. 2013) (explaining the importance of abolishing trade barriers to the 
internal market); Gaston Schul Douane Expediteur BV v. Inspecteur der Invoerrechten 
en Accijnzen Roosendaal, Case C-15/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1409, ¶ 33 (explaining that the 
EU institutions seek to eliminate obstacles to trade to bring about an internal market). 
25. Roger J. Goebel, Lawyers in the European Community: Progress Towards Community-
Wide Rights of Practice, 15 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 556, 566 (1992) (explaining that the 
freedom to provide services applies to intermittent practice, while the freedom of 
establishment protects a lawyer’s right to practice in a new residence); 2 IDA E. WENDT, 
EU COMPETITION LAW AND LIBERAL PROFESSIONS: AN UNEASY RELATIONSHIP? 40 (2012) 
(explaining the importance of the Treaty to free movement of professionals). 
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attorney was credentialed.26 Decisions by the European Court of 
Justice (the “ECJ”) and EU Directives have interpreted this 
framework as allowing Member States to restrict professionals 
only to the extent necessary, which has led to the growth of MJP 
and ALPS.27 
A professional’s right to provide services freely throughout 
the European Union is found in Article 56 of the Treaty.28 The 
Treaty provides that a Member State may not restrict an 
individual’s right to temporarily provide a range of services 
within its territory.29 Furthermore, the Council of the European 
Union, acting alone or with the European Parliament, can issue 
directives drafted by the European Commission intended to 
achieve the liberalization of services. 30  Directives instruct 
Member States to achieve a certain result without requiring any 
specific method of obtaining this result, instead leaving it to the 
Member States to determine how to implement this 
requirement.31 
                                                                                                             
26. Goebel, supra note 10, at 339 (stating that there are very few limitations to MJP 
in the European Union); Lonbay, supra note 1, at 1632 (explaining the relative ease 
with which EU lawyers can engage in temporary and permanent MJP throughout the 
European Union). 
27 . Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur Van De Bedrijfsvereniging Voor De 
Metaalnijverheid, Case 33/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1300 (holding that regulation of 
professionals must be no broader than necessary); Goebel, supra note 10, at 307–08 
(explaining the role of EU legislation and European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) case law 
in the growth of MJP in the European Union). 
28. TFEU, supra note 21, art. 56, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 70 (prohibiting rules that 
limit the freedom to provide legal services in foreign Member States); Goebel, supra 
note 10, at 309–10 (explaining that the Treaty provides an in-depth explanation of the 
right to provide legal services). 
29. TFEU, supra note 21, art. 57, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 70 (giving Europeans the 
right to provide industrial, commercial, professional, and craft services); Goebel, supra 
note 10, at 308 (explaining that the Treaty covers a range of industries, including the 
liberal professions). 
30. TFEU, supra note 21, art. 59, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 71 (proclaiming that the EU 
legislative institutions should issue directives); see, e.g., Directive 77/249/EEC of the 
Council to Facilitate the Effective Exercise by Lawyers of Freedom to Provide Services, 
1977 O.J. L 78 [hereinafter Lawyers’ Services Directive] (providing guidelines for 
regulating lawyers based on the Treaty). 
31. TFEU, supra note 21, art. 288, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 171–72 (explaining that 
directives require Member States to work toward EU goals but allow freedom to pursue 
them in their own way); Application of EU Law, http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/
introduction/what_directive_en.htm (“National authorities have to adapt their laws to 
meet these goals, but are free to decide how to do so.”). 
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The Treaty grants professionals the right to establish a 
permanent practice throughout the European Union by 
requiring Member States to allow foreigners to set up business 
or professional entities, or pursue self-employment.32 It also 
authorizes legislation for the mutual recognition of 
qualifications and for harmonization of business regulations.33 
Member States can, however, restrict establishment and service 
rights based on the Treaty’s public policy, public security, or 
public health exceptions.34 
A few key ECJ decisions have interpreted these provisions as 
applied to lawyers.35 The ECJ decided its first case regarding the 
regulation of lawyers by Member States in 1977, establishing a 
liberal framework for analyzing professional restrictions.36 In 
Van Binsbergen, a Dutch lawyer who had moved his residence to 
Belgium continued to provide legal services across the border in 
the Netherlands. 37  When the Dutch administrative authority 
                                                                                                             
32. TFEU, supra note 21, art. 49, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 67 (prohibiting rules that 
limit professional foreign establishment); Goebel, supra note 10, at 309 (explaining 
that the freedom of establishment includes the ability to set up an office abroad). 
33. TFEU, supra note 21, art. 53, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 69 (authorizing “directives for 
the mutual recognition of . . . qualifications and for the coordination of the provisions 
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action”); see, e.g., Directive 98/5/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council to Facilitate Practice of the Profession of 
Lawyer on a Permanent Basis in a Member State Other Than That in Which the 
Qualification Was Obtained, [1998] O.J. L 77/36, at 36 [hereinafter Lawyers’ 
Establishment Directive] (providing guidance on facilitating interstate practice under 
the Treaty). 
34. TFEU, supra note 21, art. 52, 62, 2012 O.J. C 326, at 69, 72 (“[The Treaty shall 
not prejudice the applicability of provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action providing for special treatment for foreign nationals on grounds 
of public policy, public security or public health.”); Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorassi AE 
v. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas, Case C-260/89 ERT, [1991] 
E.C.R. I-2925, ¶ 3 (stating that, under the Treaty, a Member State can impose 
discriminatory rules that are justified under one of these exceptions). 
35 . See, e.g., Van Binsbergen, [1974] E.C.R. 1300 (limiting the restrictions a 
Member State can place upon professionals); Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli 
Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, Case C-55/94, [1995] E.C.R. I–4186 (interpreting the 
Treaty and subsequent legislation to limit Member State regulation of professionals). 
36. Van Binsbergen, [1974] E.C.R. 1300 (holding that restrictions that limit the 
activities of professionals must be justified and non-discriminatory); Goebel, supra note 
10, at 311 (stating that Van Binsbergen set the precedent for analysis of Member State 
restrictions). 
37. Van Binsbergen, [1974] E.C.R. 1300, 1301 (“Mr. Kortmann had transferred his 
habitual residence from . . . the Netherlands . . . to Neeroeteren, in Belgium”); Goebel, 
supra note 10, at 310 (explaining that the central issue in Van Binsbergen was whether the 
2014] LEARNING FROM EU LIBERALIZATION 1585 
told him he could no longer represent a client before a Dutch 
tribunal because he was not a resident of the Netherlands, 
pursuant to Dutch rules, the lawyer claimed that he was entitled 
under the Treaty to perform the representation.38 The ECJ held 
that the Dutch authorities could not stop the lawyer from 
representing a client in an administrative proceeding.39 In so 
holding, the ECJ established three principles that form the basic 
framework for analyzing a regulation’s compatibility with the 
Treaty.40 First, Van Binsbergen stands for the principle that a 
Member State has the right to restrict the activities of 
professionals—in this case, lawyers—but only where a regulation 
is “justified by the general good,” such as “rules relating to 
organization, qualifications, professional ethics, supervision and 
liability.”41 Second, the ECJ emphasized that such rules must be 
non-discriminatory with regard to national origin and residence 
because the Court decided that a requirement of habitual 
residence might be inconsistent with the Treaty as an implied 
nationality distinction.42  Third, the ECJ stated that the free 
movement of services has a direct legal effect, meaning that an 
individual or enterprise can rely upon this Treaty-based right to 
challenge an infringing national rule. 43  Thus, challenges to 
                                                                                                             
Dutch Bar could outlaw legal practice by professionals who emigrated from the 
Netherlands). 
38. Van Binsbergen, [1974] E.C.R. 1300, 1301 (“Mr. Kortmann invoked . . . the 
Treaty providing for the progressive abolition . . . of restrictions on freedom to provide 
services within the community”); Goebel, supra note 10, at 310 (explaining the position 
of the Dutch Bar that it could restrict the activities of a non-resident). 
39. Van Binsbergen, [1974] E.C.R. 1300, ¶ 27 (holding that the Netherlands could 
not impose the contested requirement); Goebel, supra note 10, at 311 (explaining that 
the ECJ held the rule invalid as it did not serve a public interest). 
40. Van Binsbergen, [1974] E.C.R. 1300, ¶ 12 (regulations that limit practice rights 
must be “justified by the general good”); id. ¶ 10 (a Member State cannot impose 
discriminatory regulations); id. ¶¶ 18–27 (the Treaty has direct legal effect). 
41. Van Binsbergen, [1974] E.C.R. 1300, ¶ 12 (explaining that such rules may 
overcome the policy against regulations); Goebel, supra note 10, at 311 (explaining that 
Van Binsbergen established that restrictive lawyer regulation is consistent with the Treaty 
only where it serves a public goal). 
42. Van Binsbergen, [1974] E.C.R. 1300, ¶ 10 (establishing the restriction on rules 
based on habitual residence); Goebel, supra note 10, at 311 (explaining that the ECJ 
established in Van Binsbergen that Member States cannot discriminate against 
professionals from other Member States). 
43 . Van Binsbergen, [1974] E.C.R. 1300, ¶¶ 18–27 (holding that the rights 
described in the Treaty apply with no further action needed); see Goebel, supra note 10, 
at 311 (explaining that, by deciding that the Treaty has direct legal effect, the ECJ 
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Member State rules have allowed the ECJ to invalidate 
restrictions that run counter to the goals of the Treaty without 
justification in appropriate circumstances.44 
The ECJ’s decision in Van Binsbergen led the Commission 
and Council to develop the Lawyers’ Services Directive, which 
specifies how a Member State can regulate via the guidance 
articulated in Van Binsbergen.45 The directive, issued in 1977, 
establishes guidelines for the temporary provision of MJP.46 
While it provides that Member States must allow foreigners to 
practice, it also requires lawyers to use the title for lawyers from 
their state of residence (their “Home State”) to prevent 
confusion.47 The directive also authorizes Member States to 
restrict practice in court and administrative litigation to lawyers 
qualified to perform these services in their Home State. 48 
Further, it establishes that the ethical rules of the State where the 
lawyer is practicing (the “Host State”) apply to representing a 
client in legal proceedings or before public authorities, while the 
Home State’s rules apply for all other activities.49 
The directive thus created potential conflicts where 
Member States varied in their implementation of the directive 
                                                                                                             
established that professionals can rely on its provisions to defend their right to 
practice). 
44 . Van Binsbergen, [1974] E.C.R. 1300, ¶ 27 (providing for abolition of 
discriminatory rules); Goebel, supra note 10, at 311 (explaining that Van Binsbergen’s 
most important impact is the anti-discrimination policy it established under the 
Treaty). 
45. Lawyers’ Services Directive, supra note 30 (creating the framework for lawyers’ 
freedom to provide services); Goebel, supra note 10, at 312 (explaining the huge 
impact of Van Binsbergen upon the Lawyers’ Services Directive). 
46. See generally Lawyers’ Services Directive, supra note 30 (establishing rules for 
interstate legal practice); Lonbay, supra note 1, at 1641 (explaining that the directive 
allows the types of lawyers listed to engage in MJP). 
47. Lawyers’ Services Directive, supra note 30, art. 3, at 3 (requiring lawyers to 
practice under their Home State’s title); Goebel, supra note 10, at 312 (explaining that, 
when practicing under the Lawyers’ Services Directive, an attorney must use the title 
from his Home State). 
48. Lawyers’ Services Directive, supra note 30, art. 5, at 4 (permitting Member 
States to impose requirements on lawyers representing clients in certain legal 
proceedings); Goebel, supra note 10, at 312 (explaining that the directive reserves 
certain legal proceedings to lawyers with local knowledge). 
49. Lawyers’ Services Directive, supra note 30, art. 4(1), at 4 (applying Host State 
rules to “[a]ctivities relating to the representation of a client in legal proceedings or 
before public authorities”); id. art. 4(4), at 4 (specifying application of Home States 
rules in other situations). 
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and had different ethical rules.50 In response, the Council of 
Bars and Law Societies of Europe (the “CCBE”), an 
organization representing the bars and law societies of many 
Member States, sought harmonized professional responsibility 
standards throughout the European Union. 51  In 1977, the 
CCBE published the Declaration of Perugia, which states 
generally the professional principles that should be applicable 
to lawyers, such as personal integrity, confidentiality, and 
independence. 52  Furthermore, the Code of Conduct for 
European Lawyers, released by the CCBE in 1988 and 
periodically amended thereafter, provides many specific rules 
and ultimately was enacted by the bar association of every 
Member State.53 
Another troublesome aspect of lawyers and other 
professionals engaging in MJP was that distinct qualification 
standards remained an obstacle to clear directions on standards 
of practice. 54  Each Member State had its own process for 
                                                                                                             
50. COUNCIL OF BARS AND LAW SOCIETIES OF EUROPE, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR 
EUROPEAN LAWYERS § 1.3.1 (2006) (explaining that one purpose of the Code is to 
“mitigate the difficulties which result from the application” of the directive). See 
generally Jonathan Goldsmith, The Core Values of the Legal Profession for Lawyers Today and 
Tomorrow, 28 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 441, 450 (2007–2008) (explaining how 
deregulation necessitates harmonization of ethical rules). 
51 . COUNCIL OF BARS AND LAW SOCIETIES OF EUROPE: ABOUT US, http://
www.ccbe.eu/index.php?id=375&L=0 (last visited Dec. 19, 2013) (“The CCBE was 
founded in 1960, as the ramifications of the European Economic Community on the 
legal profession started to be seriously considered.”); Goebel, supra note 25, at 579–80 
(explaining that the CCBE coordinates the national bar associations in the European 
Union). 
52. COUNCIL OF BARS & LAW SOCIETIES OF EUROPE, CONSULTATIVE COMM., THE 
DECLARATION OF PERUGIA ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE BARS 
AND LAW SOCIETIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1977) (providing an explanation 
of these and other ethical principles); Goebel, supra note 25, at 579–80 (explaining that 
the CCBE adopted the Declaration of Perugia to establish general ethical principles for 
EU lawyers on October 16, 1977). 
53. COUNCIL OF BARS & LAW SOCIETIES OF EUROPE, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR 
EUROPEAN LAWYERS (2006) (establishing uniform ethical rules); see Goebel, supra note 
10, at 313 (stating that each national bar association in the European Union has 
adopted the CCBE code into its rules). 
54. Goebel, supra note 25, at 595 (stating that, by the 1980s, harmonization was 
perceived as being too slow a process); Barnard, supra note 24, at 308 (explaining the 
problems associated with the single market program before the application of 
harmonization was extended to lawyers); Directive 89/48/EEC of the Council on a 
General System for the Recognition of Higher-Education Diplomas Awarded on 
Completion of Professional Education and Training of at Least Three Years’ Duration, 
1989 O.J. L 19/16 [hereinafter Diploma Recognition Directive], later replaced by 
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education and its own qualification standards, which made the 
Member States reluctant to give foreign professionals, including 
lawyers, full privileges to practice.55 
To address this issue, the Council adopted the Diploma 
Recognition Directive in December 1988 to foster mutual 
recognition of, and confidence in, qualifications across Member 
States.56 The Diploma Recognition Directive allows all types of 
professionals to practice throughout the EU by requiring 
Member States to recognize foreign qualifications.57 
The application of this directive to the legal profession 
posed a particular problem because the proper practice of law 
depends on local knowledge, and legal education and training, 
and, thus, is drastically varied among the Member States.58 
Accordingly, the directive allowed Member States the discretion 
to verify a lawyer’s professional competence through either an 
aptitude test or a period of supervised training.59 
With these new rules in place, the ECJ articulated a new 
standard for determining whether national regulation was overly 
restrictive under the Treaty, the Lawyers’ Services Directive, and 
                                                                                                             
Parliament & Council Directive No. 2005/36 on the Recognition of Professional 
Qualifications, 2005 O.J. L 255/22 [hereinafter Professional Qualifications Recognition 
Directive]. 
55. Diploma Recognition Directive, supra note 54, at 16 (emphasizing the goal of 
meeting the expectation of nationals expecting to have their qualifications recognized 
throughout the EU). See generally Goebel, supra note 25 (explaining the reasons for the 
directive and how it effectuated its objectives). 
56. See Goebel, supra note 25, at 595 (stating that directive instructed Member 
States to trust each other’s education standards and recognize foreign diplomas as 
equal to its own); see also Vlassopoulou v. Ministerium für Justiz, Bundesund 
Europaangelegenheiten Baden-Württemberg, Case C-340/89 [1991] E.C.R. I-2358 
(confirming that the principle of mutual recognition of diplomas applies to people as 
well as goods). 
57. Diploma Recognition Directive, supra note 54, art. 3, at 19 (prohibiting 
restrictions based on out-of-state qualifications); Lonbay, supra note 1, at 1645 (stating 
that the Directive allows professionals to have Member States recognize their 
qualifications). 
58. Diploma Recognition Directive, supra note 54, art. 4(1)(b), at 19 (making an 
exception for “professions whose practice requires precise knowledge of national law 
and in respect of which the provision of advice and/or assistance concerning national 
law is an essential and constant aspect of the professional activity”); Goebel, supra note 
25, at 597 (stating that, because Member States have different laws and traditions, their 
legal education and training varies). 
59. EU REPORT, supra note 1, at 16 (stating that Member States can require an 
aptitude test or an adaptation period); Lonbay, supra note 1, at 1645 (explaining that 
Member States can test competence or require an adjustment period). 
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the Diploma Recognition Directive. 60  Gebhard v. Milan Bar 
Council involved a German lawyer who had been sanctioned by 
the Milan Bar Council for using the Italian title of avvocato.61 
Gebhard, who had practiced in Italy for many years, appealed 
the sanction and claimed that he was entitled to practice in Italy 
under the Lawyers’ Services Directive. 62  The National Bar 
Council asked the ECJ whether Italy had properly implemented 
the Lawyers’ Services and Diploma Recognition Directives and 
how to decide whether a lawyer was practicing on a temporary 
basis.63 
The ECJ held that Gebhard was not practicing temporarily, 
but working as an established lawyer in Italy, because of the 
“duration . . . regularity, periodicity or continuity” of his 
practice.” 64  However, the ECJ noted that a professional 
practicing temporarily has the right to set up the 
“infrastructure” needed to provide services. 65  Having thus 
discussed the freedom to provide services, the ECJ moved on to 
                                                                                                             
60. Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, Case 
C-55/94 [1995] E.C.R. I-4186 (expanding the standard from Van Binsbergen and 
incorporating the Diploma Recognition Directive); see Goebel, supra note 10, at 316 
(explaining the importance of Gebhard). 
61 . Gebhard, [1995] E.C.R. I-4186, ¶¶ 4–9 (describing Gebhard’s German 
background and long-term practice in Milan); Goebel, supra note 10, at 316 
(explaining that the Milan Bar sanctioned Gebhard “because of his permanent practice 
in Italy, using the title of ‘avvocato,’ without being qualified as an Italian lawyer.”). 
62. Gebhard, [1995] E.C.R. I-4186, ¶ 12 (explaining that Gebhard argued he was 
entitled to practice in Milan under the Lawyers’ Services Directive); Goebel, supra note 
10, at 316 (stating that Gebhard justified his practice in Italy by asserting his right to 
practice under the Lawyers’ Services Directive). 
63. Gebhard, [1995] E.C.R. I-4186, ¶ 18 (describing the questions the Milan Bar 
referred to the Court); Goebel, supra note 10, at 316 (“[T]he National Bar Council 
asked the Court of Justice whether a 1982 Italian law had properly implemented the 
Lawyers’ Services Directive and what criteria should be used in determining the extent 
to which a foreign lawyer may practice in Italy under the terms of the directive.”). 
64. Gebhard, [1995] E.C.R. I-4186, ¶¶ 27, 28 (distinguishing the facts of the instant 
case from temporary provision of services); Goebel, supra note 10, at 317 (stating that 
the ECJ’s judgment in Gebhard provided guidance on what makes practice temporary 
rather than permanent). 
65. Gebhard, [1995] E.C.R. I-4186, ¶ 27 (holding that a short-term service provider 
can establish necessary aspects of legal practice to aid in provision of services); Goebel, 
supra note 10, at 317 (emphasizing that the ECJ held that providing services 
temporarily does not preclude the ability to establish the necessary infrastructure). This 
means that a law firm can maintain a permanent office, staffed with non-lawyers, to 
allow its attorneys the ability to provide temporary services in another Member State. 
See id. (explaining that a law firm can employ a non-legal staff in a foreign Member 
State to aid in providing services). 
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professional establishment standards, characterizing the Treaty 
concept of professional establishment as “a very broad one” 
and announcing several rules to that end.66 
First, it created a liberal framework for regulating interstate 
establishment by holding that, although lawyers must comply 
with their Host State’s conditions, any regulation that could 
violate the Treaty must fulfill four conditions.67  Specifically, 
these rules must be (1) equally applicable to nationals and 
foreigners, (2) justified by some overriding public necessity, (3) 
properly targeted to achieve their stated objective, and (4) not 
broader than necessary to achieve their goal.68 Furthermore, the 
ECJ held that Member States cannot limit interstate 
establishment by ignoring foreign qualifications.69 
Similar to the Lawyers’ Services Directive after the Van 
Binsbergen decision, the legislative EU institutions worked to 
implement the ECJ’s guidance by creating a more 
comprehensive directive on lawyers’ rights.70 The 1998 Lawyers’ 
Establishment Directive eliminates most national barriers to 
lawyers’ establishment.71 The directive provides two ways for a 
                                                                                                             
66. Gebhard, [1995] E.C.R. I-4186, ¶ 25 (explaining that establishment is a liberal 
concept); see EU REPORT, supra note 1, at 204 (“[T]he so-called Gebhard-test mean[s] 
that there should be a reason of compelling public interest, no discrimination, 
necessity, suitability and, in particular, proportionality, i.e. the prohibition is not 
justified if a less restrictive measure is available.”). 
67. Gebhard, [1995] E.C.R. I-4186, ¶ 37 (describing the four requirements for a 
restriction to be valid); Goebel, supra note 10, at 316 (the Court interpreted the 
establishment provisions “in a very liberal manner”). 
68. Gebhard, [1995] E.C.R. I-4186, ¶ 37 (holding that “national measures liable to 
hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the 
Treaty must . . . be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; they must be justified by 
imperative requirements in the general interest; they must be suitable for securing the 
attainment of the objective which they pursue; and they must not go beyond what is 
necessary to attain it”); George C. Nnona, Multidisciplinary Practice in the International 
Context: Realigning the Perspective on the European Union’s Regulatory Regime, 37 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 115, 128 n.60 (stating that the ECJ held that national rules that limit practice 
rights must fulfill these four conditions). 
69. Gebhard, [1995] E.C.R. I-4186, ¶ 38 (holding that Member States must consider 
foreign diplomas equivalent to their own); Lonbay, supra note 1, at 1645–46 
(“[Although Gebhard deliberately left the issue of competence and regulation of 
qualification regimes within the national orbit . . . [n]ational jurisdiction exercised in 
this field still has to respect the principles of EU law.”). 
70. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
71. Lawyers’ Establishment Directive, supra note 33, at 36, ¶ 4 (directing Member 
States to allow a lawyer who “possesses professional experience in that Member State” 
to “integrate into the profession in the host Member State”); Lonbay, supra note 1, at 
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lawyer to establish himself outside his Home State.72 One option 
is to retain his Home State’s title for lawyers while engaging in 
some types of practice in the Host State.73 The other is to qualify 
as a Host State lawyer, thus obtaining the Host State’s title, by 
practicing there for three years subject to local review and 
rules.74 Regardless of which route a lawyer takes, he must limit 
his practice to areas in which he is competent.75 
In the early 2000s, the European Council established the 
“Lisbon Strategy,” encouraging the growth of competition and 
the further liberalization of professions.76 The EU institutions, 
endeavoring to promote the Lisbon policy, have taken steps 
toward its goals, including a stronger economy and better lives 
for Europeans.77 Thus, the EU regulatory climate for lawyers, 
among other professionals, becomes ever-more liberal.78 
                                                                                                             
1641 (explaining that the directive allows EU lawyers to establish practice in Member 
States other than their own). 
72. Lawyers’ Establishment Directive, supra note 33, arts. 2, 10, at 38, 40–41 
(describing the Home State and Host State methods of establishment); Lonbay, supra 
note 1, at 1641 (explaining that the directive provides two modes of establishment for 
lawyers). 
73. Lawyers’ Establishment Directive, supra note 33, art. 2, at 38 (allowing lawyers 
to “pursue on a permanent basis, in any other Member State under his home-country 
professional title,” many activities of the profession); Lonbay, supra note 1, at 1641–42 
(stating that a lawyer can establish in another Member State under his Home State 
title). 
74. Lawyers’ Establishment Directive, supra note 33, art. 10, at 40–41 (providing 
lawyers the opportunity to practice in a Member State under the title used therein for 
lawyers); Lonbay, supra note 1, at 1642 (“[The Directive creates a new entry route to 
membership of bars and law societies [that allows foreigners] to transform . . . into a 
Host State lawyer.”). 
75. See COUNCIL OF BARS AND LAW SOCIETIES OF EUROPE, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR 
EUROPEAN LAWYERS § 3.1.3 (2006) (stating that a lawyer must refuse work he cannot 
handle); Lonbay, supra note 1, at 1642 (explaining that bars and law societies depend 
on attorneys to practice with integrity, which includes staying within their 
competence). 
76 . Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council, (Mar. 23–24, 2000), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm (setting objectives to 
“strengthen employment, economic reform and social cohesion as part of a knowledge-
based economy”); CORDIS Programmes Lisbon Strategy, http://cordis.europa.eu/
programme/rcn/843_en.html (seeking to encourage investment and employment in 
the European Union by working to improve its economic, social, and environmental 
climates). 
77 . See Communication from the Commission: Report on Competition in 
Professional Services, COM(2004) 83 final 3 (Feb. 9, 2004) [hereinafter 2004 Report] 
(explaining the need to reform professional services rules as a result of the important 
role professions have in improving the economy); Laurel S. Terry, The European 
Commission Project Regarding Competition in Professional Services, 20 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 
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As the EU’s Member States become increasingly 
intertwined, national rules embracing partnerships with non-
lawyers have spread have rapidly, and several Member States 
have eliminated ALPS restrictions in recent years.79 ALPS have 
long been allowed in the European Union—some types have 
existed in Germany since 1994 80 —but the Lawyers’ 
Establishment Directive allows Member States to prohibit ALPS, 
at least in some circumstances. 81  Competition authorities, 
however, are skeptical of such rules.82 This skepticism brought a 
Dutch law prohibiting partnerships of lawyers and auditors to 
the ECJ, which held that it was permissible.83  
                                                                                                             
3 (2009) (the Lisbon Strategy “has been cited as support for the EU Initiative, EU 
regulation of legal practice, and the European Court of Justice cases that provided part 
of the impetus for this initiative”). 
78. Goldsmith, supra note 50, at 442 (analyzing Member State action toward 
creating a system for lawyer regulation that exerts less oversight over attorneys). See 
generally Lonbay, supra note 1 (discussing recent developments in the ability of EU 
lawyers to practice throughout multiple jurisdictions). 
79. Charles W. Wolfram, Comparative Multi-Disciplinary Practice of Law: Paths Taken 
and Not Taken, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 961, 978 (2002) (“[T]he right to provide 
services [throughout the EU] is generally pushing toward permitting in many, if not all, 
countries many kinds of practices that are permissible in any one.”); see Goldsmith, 
supra note 50, at 441 (explaining that meetings among EU governments, deliberate 
idea-spreading by the European Commission, and media attention have increased the 
ease with which ideas spread among Member States). 
80. Terry, supra note 7, at 1557 (stating that MDPs have been allowed in Germany 
since 1994); Wolfram, supra note 79, at 978 (explaining that ALPS have existed in 
Europe for a quarter century). 
81. EU REPORT, supra note 1, at 204 (“[I]t is unclear whether the right of the Host 
State to forbid [ALPS] is per se a right or whether the exercise of such right must meet 
the so-called Gebhard-test . . . .”); see Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse 
Orde van Advocaten, Case C-309/99, [2002] E.C.R. I-1653, ¶ 110 (holding that the 
Dutch bar could prohibit partnerships between lawyers and auditors because, in the 
bar’s judgment, these partnerships threatened the functioning of the Dutch legal 
profession). 
82. See Mario Monti, Comm’r for Competition, European Comm’n, Competition in 
Professional Services: New Light and New Challenges (Mar. 21, 2003), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/liberalization/conference/speeches/
mmonti_berlin_032003_en.pdf [hereinafter Monti speech] (suggesting that some 
national regulations might not “continue to serve the legitimate purposes of the 
protection of the public interest”); 2004 Report, supra note 77, at 3 (explaining that, 
according to research, outdated rules negatively impact consumers). 
83. See Wouters, [2002] E.C.R. I-1653, ¶ 110 (holding that the Dutch bar could 
prohibit partnerships between lawyers and auditors); Terry, supra note 77, at 19 (stating 
that the ECJ allowed the Dutch ban to stand). 
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The Wouters case began in 1995, when the Amsterdam Bar 
refused to allow a lawyer-auditor partnership. 84  The EU 
Advocate General recommended remanding the case to the 
Dutch court for consideration of whether the ban, which was in 
his opinion necessary, could be less restrictive. 85  The ECJ, 
however, declined to send the case back to the Dutch court, 
holding that the ban did not violate the Treaty’s provisions on 
anti-competition, services, or establishment.86 In so holding, the 
ECJ recognized the anti-competitive effects of the ban, and its 
possible infringement on free services and establishment, but 
found the professional concerns raised by partnerships between 
lawyers and auditors sufficient to render the ban necessary.87  
Despite Wouters, implementation of ALPS has continued, 
partially due to pro-competition initiatives.88 Incidentally, Wouters 
and another 2002 decision89 deferring to a Member State’s view 
                                                                                                             
84. Wouters, [2002] E.C.R. I–1653, ¶ 28 (stating that the Dutch authority decided 
in July 1995 that the partnership was not allowed due to a ban on lawyer-auditor 
associations); see Laurel S. Terry, MDPs, Spinning, and Wouters v. NOVA, 52 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 867, 868–69 (2004) (explaining that the Supervisory Board of the Order of 
Attorneys for the District of Amsterdam decided in July 1995 not to allow the proposed 
partnership). 
85. Terry, supra note 84, at 874–75 (explaining that the Advocate General 
recommended that the ECJ remand the case to the national court for a determination 
of whether the ban was necessary and proportional); Opinion of Advocate General 
Léger, Wouters v. NOVA, [2002] E.C.R. I-1653, ¶ 256 (opining that consideration of 
whether the ban was necessary and proportional “must be referred back to the national 
court”). 
86. Wouters, [2002] E.C.R. I-1653, ¶ 110 (holding that the ban did not violate the 
Treaty because it could “reasonably be considered to be necessary for the proper 
practice of the legal profession [in the Netherlands]”); Terry, supra note 84, at 886 
(explaining that the ECJ’s analysis of whether the ban violated the Treaty provisions on 
freedom of services and establishment followed its consideration of the ban under anti-
competition provisions). 
87. Wouters, [2002] E.C.R. I-1653, ¶¶ 87–108 (“[Although the ban is] liable to 
limit production and technical development . . . [it could] reasonably be considered 
necessary [to the practice of law in the Netherlands and the Bar was] entitled to 
consider [that the rule’s objectives could not] be attained by less restrictive means.”); 
id. ¶ 122 (holding that, even if the rule was a violation of free movement, “that 
restriction would in any event appear to be justified for the reasons set out [in the 
competition analysis]”). 
88. See Goldsmith, supra note 50, at 450 (explaining that, despite the ECJ’s 
decision in Wouters, the United Kingdom implemented ALPS that are even “more 
radical” than those at issue in that case); see Paton, supra note 4, at 2232–36  (stating 
that the Legal Services Act of 2007 was a response to antitrust pressure). 
89. Criminal Proceedings Against Manuele Arduino, Case C-35/99, [2002] E.C.R. 
I-1561, ¶ 44 (holding that Italian fee schedules were permissible because they were not 
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of a restrictive regulation as necessary inspired one such 
initiative.90  The Commission, concerned about how Member 
States would interpret and implement these decisions, undertook 
a stocktaking exercise to study and regulate restrictions on the 
liberal professions. 91  In February 2004, the Commission 
published a report detailing competition principles in 
connection with several liberal professions, including legal 
practice, emphasizing the importance of deregulation to the 
Lisbon strategy.92 On May 1, 2004, the Council’s Regulation 
1/2003 became effective, directing Member States to work with 
one another as well as the Commission to end activities that 
violate the Treaty or Member State laws on competition.93  
Additionally, in 2006 the Parliament and Council issued the 
Services Directive, emphasizing the importance of freedom of 
establishment and services for all professionals, to further 
increase competition and strive toward the goals of the Lisbon 
Strategy.94 Article 16 of the Directive, which basically provides a 
                                                                                                             
too restrictive); see also European Commission v. Italian Republic, Case C-565/08 [2011] 
I–2115 (dismissing the Commission’s challenge to Italy’s fee schedules). 
90. See Terry, supra note 77, at 26 (explaining that the European Commission 
called a meeting to discuss competition issues, including proper treatment of the ECJ’s 
decisions in Wouters and Arduino); Competition: Study on the Economic Impact of Member 
States’ Regulation in the Field of Liberal Professions, CCBE INFO, Jan. 2003, at 5, available at 
http://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/NTCdocument/n_04_enpdf1_11809660
23.pdf (describing a discussion among national authorities “to reach a common view 
on the interpretation of the Wouters and Arduino judgments”). 
91. 2004 Report, supra note 77, at 7 (explaining that the Commission performed a 
survey to “obtain a better understanding of the regulation of liberal professions and its 
effects”); Terry, supra note 77, at 43 (describing the questions the Commission asked 
about regulation of liberal professions). 
92. See 2004 Report, supra note 77, at 3 (stating that the purpose of the report was 
to “set out the Commission’s thinking from the perspective of competition policy on 
the scope to reform or modernise specific professional rules”); Terry, supra note 77, at 
49 (explaining that the report, issued by the Commission in February 2004, provided 
specific information on the value of regulations relative to the burden they impose on 
competition and progress). 
93. Council Regulation No. 1/2003/EC on the Implementation of the Rules on 
Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. L 1/1, ¶ 1 
(providing for “legislation designed to meet the challenges of an integrated market 
and a future enlargement of the Community”); Terry, supra note 77, at 12–13 
(explaining that the impact of the regulation, which took effect on May 1, 2004, is that 
Member States must address modern antitrust in all contexts and work in close 
cooperation with the Commission). 
94. Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Services in the Internal Market, 2006 O.J. L 376/36, ¶¶ 1–2 [hereinafter 2006 
Directive] (seeking “economic and social progress” by calling for “a free market which 
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summary of case law regarding the freedom to provide services, 
does not apply matters covered by the Lawyers’ Services 
Directive.95 The directive also calls for abolition of bans on ALPS 
to further the goals of the directive except where necessary for 
professional ethics, independence, and impartiality.96 
2. Regulating Lawyers in the United States and the States’ 
Control Over the Profession 
The basic principles upon which the United States was 
founded stand in stark contrast to the EU’s search for prosperity 
through a combination of resources and the elimination of 
barriers to liberal practice.97 The US Constitution emphasizes 
state autonomy, and does not expressly address the right to 
provide services or establish oneself professionally. 98 
Professional responsibility rules in the United States are 
therefore largely created by states, with guidance from the 
Model Rules.99 However, the US Supreme Court has used the 
limited, but important, federal oversight granted it by the US 
Constitution to invalidate regulations that violate the 
Constitution or other federal law.100  
                                                                                                             
compels the Member States to eliminate restrictions on cross-border provision of 
services”); see Timm Rentrop, The Services Directive: What is Actually New?, 2 BULL. EUR. 
INST. PUB. ADMIN. 17, 17 (2007) (stating that the directive is part of the Lisbon 
Strategy’s economic reform plan). 
95. 2006 Directive, supra note 94, art. 17(4), at 58 (explaining that article 16 does 
not apply to “matters covered by” the Lawyers’ Services Directive); EU REPORT, supra 
note 1, at 65 (stating that article 17 “does not say that all activities of lawyers are 
excluded, but only matters covered by the Lawyers’ Services Directive”). 
96. 2006 Directive, supra note 94, art. 25, at 62 (calling for an end to restrictions 
on ALPS); Laurel S. Terry et al., International Legal Developments in Review: 2007, 42 
INT’L LAW. 833, 858 n.152 (2008) (explaining that the directive includes “measures to 
increase trust and confidence in cross-border services, such as . . . multi-disciplinary 
practices”). 
97. Goebel, supra note 10, at 318 (“[I]n contrast to the explicit provisions in the 
EC Treaty setting forth the freedom to provide interstate professional services and the 
related right of establishment, the United States Constitution contains no express 
statement of such rights.”); see U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving to the states all powers 
not expressly granted to the federal government). 
98. See Goebel, supra note 10, at 318; see also U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
99. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
100. Hazard, supra note 20, at 1178 (explaining that the Supreme Court has 
limited state regulation with the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Privileges and 
Immunities Clauses, and the First Amendment); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) 
(establishing that the Supreme Court has the power of judicial review); Martin v. 
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The US Supreme Court has recognized the importance of 
the right to practice law in many contexts, and strikes down 
restrictions that burden this right unless the rule achieves an 
extremely important goal.101 The Court has held that a state’s 
exclusion of a qualified applicant from the bar is invidious 
discrimination in violation of the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses.102 Furthermore, the Court considers legal 
services included in the right to provide interstate commercial 
services recognized under the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause.103 The Court explained this doctrine in 1985, when it 
struck down a New Hampshire law requiring state residency for 
bar membership under the Privileges and Immunities Clause in 
Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper.104 The Court found the 
state’s argument that the requirement served to ensure lawyers’ 
competence and compliance with ethical rules, which the dissent 
echoed, insufficient to deprive lawyers from outside New 
Hampshire of the right to practice law.105 
                                                                                                             
Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816) (extending judicial review to allow invalidation of 
state laws). 
101. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 726–30 (1973) (holding that, as 
excluding aliens from the practice of law is discriminatory, the exclusion violated the 
Equal Protection Clause because Connecticut did not establish that it was absolutely 
necessary “in order to vindicate its undoubted interest in high professional 
standards”); see also, e.g., Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 288 
(1985) (finding that New Hampshire failed to show that its residency requirement bore 
a “close or substantial relation” to a substantial goal). 
102. See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of N.M., 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (holding 
that exclusion of a bar applicant for past communist activities, without a finding that he 
failed to meet qualifications, violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses); 
Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 724 (finding “a link between citizenship and the powers and 
responsibilities of the lawyer in Connecticut” insufficient to justify excluding aliens from 
the bar and holding the exclusion invalid under the Equal Protection Clause). 
103. Piper, 470 U.S. at 281 (holding that, due to the economic importance of the 
practice of law, along with lawyers’ important “noncommercial role and duty” to 
represent clients with unpopular federal claims, the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
covers lawyers); Goebel, supra note 10, at 322 (“[T]he United States Supreme Court 
has solidly established the principle that lawyers can claim the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause in some circumstances when engaging in interstate legal practice.”). 
104. See Piper, 470 U.S. at 281. 
105. Piper, 470 U.S. at 284–87 (rejecting New Hampshire’s proffered explanations 
for the ban); id. at 292 (Rehnquist J., dissenting) (“[T]he State has a substantial interest 
in creating its own set of laws responsive to its own local interests, and it is reasonable 
for a State to decide that those people who have been trained to analyze the law and 
policy are better equipped to write those state laws and adjudicate cases arising under 
them.”). 
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Two other key cases where the US Supreme Court 
invalidated regulations that violated federal law highlight the 
inherent tension between state regulation of attorneys and the 
Court’s protection of constitutional and statutory goals.106 In 
both cases, one addressing mandatory fee schedules for lawyers 
and one attorney advertising, the Court failed to see a 
connection between ethical concerns and the regulation at issue 
sufficient to justify contravention of federal law.107 
In Goldfarb v. State Bar of Virginia, the US Supreme Court 
struck down a mandatory fee schedule, rejecting Virginia’s 
assertion that the special professionalism concerns of the legal 
profession meant that it constituted a “learned professions” 
exception to the Sherman Antitrust Act.108 Similarly, the Court 
rejected Arizona’s assertion that disallowing a prohibition on 
attorney advertising would demean the profession in Bates v. 
State Bar of Arizona.109 The Court determined that this Arizona 
rule created a blanket prohibition on attorney advertising that 
violated the First Amendment.110 
Although the Supreme Court has recognized the 
importance of the right to freely practice law, a US attorney can 
generally only practice in the state where he passed the bar 
examination (his “Bar State”). 111  Modern practice, however, 
                                                                                                             
106. See Goldfarb v. State Bar of Va., 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (invalidating fee 
schedules in violation of the Sherman Act); see also Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 
350 (1977) (prohibiting advertising restrictions under the First Amendment). 
107. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 369 (rejecting “the assertion that advertising will 
diminish the attorney’s reputation in the community”); see also Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 793 
(declining to consider lawyers outside the scope of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act). 
108. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 786–87 (rejecting the argument that the legal profession 
was exempted as a “learned profession” from the Sherman Act); id. at 793 (holding 
that lawyers who act to restrain competition are subject to the Sherman Act); see 
Thomas D. Morgan, The Impact of Antitrust Law on the Legal Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 415, 426 (1998) (“[I]t was the Court’s rejection of the learned profession 
exemption that has had the most direct effect on lawyers and other professionals”). 
109 . Bates, 433 U.S. at 368 (finding “the postulated connection between 
advertising and the erosion of true professionalism to be severely strained”); See Terry, 
supra note 77, at 7 (explaining that the Court in Bates struck down Arizona’s prohibition 
on lawyer advertising as a violation of the First Amendment). 
110. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384 (holding that attorney advertising prohibitions were not 
consistent with the First Amendment); see Terry, supra note 77, at 7 (Bates struck down a 
“disciplinary rule that prohibited lawyers from advertising”). 
111. Wald, supra note 12, at 498 (explaining that the US legal profession is still 
regulated on a state-by-state basis); Goebel, supra note 10, at 308 (stating that the 
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provides US lawyers with ample reasons to practice away from 
home, calling state-by-state regulation into question.112 
The issue captured widespread attention in 1998 when the 
California Supreme Court decided, in Birbrower, Montalbano, 
Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, that 
a New York attorney was not entitled to fees for work done in 
California.113 The court held that the practice was unauthorized 
under a California law that prohibited legal representation 
without State Bar membership, calling attention to the risks 
associated with the widening gap between the varying state-
created regulations and the reality of practice.114 
Although litigators have long been allowed to engage in 
MJP by pro hac vice admission in certain limited situations, 
traditionally transactional lawyers had not been afforded any 
such leeway.115 Many transactional lawyers, however, negotiated 
deals, counseled clients, and collected fees outside of their Bar 
State, despite the fact that this practice was technically 
                                                                                                             
restrictive rules on MJP within the United States are “in sharp contrast” with the liberal 
regulation embraced in the European Union). 
112. Wald, supra note 12, at 491 (“Although technological advances continue to 
flatten our world;
 
clients’ needs increasingly span jurisdictional, regional, and national 
borders; large law firms become national, even global entities; and outsourcing and off-
shoring legal services become a reality, still, the regulation of the legal profession 
continues to be state based.”); Charles J. Wolfram, Expanding State Jurisdiction to 
Regulate Out of State Lawyers, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1015, 1016 (2002) (criticizing the US 
practice of considering lawyers beyond the control of professional discipline outside 
their Bar State). 
113. Gillers, supra note 8, at 960 (stating that the Birbrower decision attracted 
widespread attention and prompted the ABA to update its rules); 2002 MJP Report, 
supra note 3, at 3 (explaining that Birbrower highlights “the concern that . . . the laws will 
impede lawyers’ ability to meet their clients’ multi-state and interstate legal needs 
efficiently and effectively”). 
114. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 4th 119, 
140 (1998) (holding that Birbrower’s performance of services in California violated a 
state statute requiring state bar membership to practice, and that Birbrower was 
therefore not entitled to the fees for the services); Gillers, supra note 8, at 959 
(“Lawyers were spurred into action because here was a living casualty of a dated idea 
and even more so because other lawyers could easily see themselves in the same 
predicament.”). 
115 . 2002 MJP Report, supra note 3, at 2 (explaining that restrictions on 
unauthorized practice outside one’s Bar State “have long been qualified by pro hac vice 
provisions, which allow courts or administrative agencies to authorize an out-of-state 
lawyer to represent a client in a particular case before the tribunal”); William T. 
Barker, The Interstate Practice of Law: are you crossing the line? 67 DEF. COUNS. J. 436, 436 
(2000) (describing the lack of a system corresponding to pro hac vice admission for 
transactional lawyers). 
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unauthorized—the attorney in Birbrower was just one who got 
caught.116 
The ABA accordingly decided to study MJP, and in 2002 the 
House of Delegates adopted all nine recommendations 
submitted by the ABA Commission on Multijurisdictional 
Practice to facilitate MJP.117 The changes included amendments 
to Model Rule 5.5 that changed its title from “Unauthorized 
Practice of Law” to “Unauthorized Practice of Law; 
Multijurisdictional Practice of Law,” and added exceptions to 
the rule’s original prohibition on MJP.118 
Additionally, the creation of the Model Rule on Admission 
by Motion allows a lawyer to gain bar admission outside his Bar 
State without taking another examination.119 Furthermore, the 
creation of the Model Rule on Pro Hac Vice Admission 
harmonized state processes regarding out-of-state lawyers 
engaged in litigation.120 
Despite these strides, however, those within the profession 
soon began to discuss whether further changes were 
                                                                                                             
116. See Gillers, supra note 8, at 959 (explaining that the rules on unauthorized 
practice diverged from how lawyers really behaved); Birbrower, 17 Cal. 4th at 119 
(“[T]he firm involved engaged in extensive unauthorized law practice in California 
[because] [i]ts attorneys traveled to California [and worked with clients there].”). 
117. 2002 MJP Report, supra note 3, at 5–6 (summarizing the proposed changes 
related to unauthorized or multijurisdictional practice of law); ABA Comm’n on 
Multijurisdictional Practice, ABA Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice Report 
on Client Representation in the 21st Century 2 (2002) (“The ABA House of Delegates 
then adopted all nine recommendations contained in the Final Report”). 
118 . 2002 MJP Report, supra note 3, at 5 (summarizing the Commission’s 
recommendations, including changing the title of Model Rule 5.5 and adopting Rule 
5.5(c) to identify exceptions to the prohibition on out-of-state practice); Report 201B, 
supra note 3, at 1 (describing the changes to Model Rule 5.5, including re-titling the 
rule and providing exceptions to its general prohibition on MJP). 
119. 2002 MJP Report, supra note 3, at 6 (recommending that “the ABA adopt the 
proposed Model Rule on Admission by Motion to facilitate the licensing of the lawyer, if 
the lawyer is admitted to practice in another United States jurisdiction, has been 
engaged in the active practice of law for a significant period of time and is in good 
standing in all jurisdictions where admitted”); ABA Comm’n on Multijurisdictional 
Practice, ABA Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice Report 201G to the House of 
Delegates (Aug. 2002) [hereinafter Report 201G] (stating that the ABA adopted the 
proposed Model Rule on Admission by Motion). 
120. 2002 MJP Report, supra note 3, at 6 (recommending the adoption of the 
proposed Model Rule on Pro Hac Vice Admission); ABA Comm’n on Multijurisdictional 
Practice, ABA Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice Report 201F to the House of 
Delegates (Aug. 2002) [hereinafter Report 201F] (stating that the ABA adopted the 
proposed Model Rule on Pro Hac Vice Admission). 
1600 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1575 
necessary.121 This issue, among others, led the ABA to create the 
Commission on Ethics 20/20 (the “20/20 Commission”) in 
August 2009 in order to address the effects of technology and 
globalization on the profession and the lack of cross-border 
uniformity in the regulation of lawyers.122 However, the ABA 
ultimately did not propose any amendments to the Model Rule 
on Motion by Admission, and the amendments made to Model 
Rule 5.5 and the Model Rule on Pro Hac Vice Admission related 
only to foreign lawyers.123 
3. Alternative Legal Practice Structures in the United States: 
Interest and Opposition 
The prohibition on US lawyers sharing fees with non-
lawyers is a long-standing tradition; it appeared in the ABA’s 
1928 Canons of Professional Ethics, its 1969 Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility, and, after some debate, made it into 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 1983.124 However, 
the prohibition is also controversial, with vehement advocates 
                                                                                                             
121. See ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 Issues 
Paper Concerning the ABA Model Rule on Admission by Motion, at 1 (Dec. 2, 2010) 
[hereinafter Motion Admission Paper] (discussing whether the ABA should amend the 
Model Rule on Admission by Motion to “better accommodate the increase” in MJP). 
See generally Wald, supra note 12 (explaining the ways that state-by-state regulation fails 
to fit with national law practice). 
122. Ethics 20/20 Preliminary Outline, supra note 15, at 1 (seeking to “ensure 
that the Model Rules keep pace with societal change and the evolution of the practice 
of law and that other sources of professional regulation”). See generally Paton, supra 
note 4 (explaining the effect of globalization, especially reforms in the UK, on the 
ABA’s establishment of the Commission). 
123. ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 Final 
Report 3–10 (Feb. 2013) [hereinafter Ethics 20/20 Final Report] (summarizing the 
proposed amendments); ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, ABA Commission on Ethics 
20/20 Report to the House of Delegates Revised 107A (providing the amended Model 
Rule 5.5); ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 Report to 
the House of Delegates Revised 107C (providing the amended Model Rule on Pro Hac 
Vice Admission). 
124. Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board: A Proposal 
for Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1, 3–4, 8 (1998) (explaining that, 
during the Kutak Convention in 1983, the ABA embraced the view that the traditional 
prohibition on ALPS should be eliminated); Annual Report of the American Bar 
Association, 51 A.B.A. 778 (1928) (“In the formation of partnerships for the practice of 
law, no person should be admitted who is not a member of the legal profession.”). 
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on both sides of the debate over whether the ABA should 
eliminate or relax this prohibition.125 
In 1998, prompted by technological innovation, an 
expanding global economy, and an aging generation of 
individual clients, the ABA created the Commission on 
Multidisciplinary Practice to study the possibility of allowing 
ALPS.126 The Commission presented two recommendations to 
the ABA House of Delegates, which rejected both.127 Its June 
1999 Report and Recommendation suggested a broad 
amendment to the Model Rules that would allow fee sharing or 
multidisciplinary practice. 128  The May 2000 Report and 
Recommendation also suggested implementation of fee sharing 
and partnerships with non-lawyers, but with control of the 
practice left to the states. 129  Although the Commission was 
                                                                                                             
125. Letter from Richard L. Thies to ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20 (Feb. 23, 
2012) at 4, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/ethics_2020/ethics_20_20_comments/thies_alpsdiscussiondraft.
authcheckdam.pdf (expressing concerns that nonlawyer ownership will “facilitate the 
destruction of the independence and core values of the legal profession and ultimately 
the judicial branch of government”); Comments of Professor Thomas D. Morgan on 
the Discussion Paper on Alternative Law Practice Structures 12 (Jan. 30, 2012) (“It is 
frequently hard for lawyers to welcome change, but I believe that on the topic of 
Alternative Law Practice Structures your Commission has proposed too little, not too 
much.”). 
126. Laurel S. Terry, The Work of the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice 2–
3, in STEPHEN J. MCGARRY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICES AND PARTNERSHIPS: LAWYERS, 
CONSULTANTS AND CLIENTS (stating that the ABA President in August 1998 created the 
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice); see ABA Comm’n on Multidisciplinary 
Practice, Background Paper on Multidisciplinary Practice Issues and Developments 
(Jan. 1999), available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_
responsibility/commission_multidisciplinary_practice/multicomreport0199.html 
(explaining that the aging Baby Boomer generation and the expansion of the global 
economy led many individual and business clients to want and need coordinated advice 
from teams of professionals). 
127. Terry, supra note 126, at 2–2 (stating that the House of Delegates defeated 
both of the ABA’s proposals); Recommendation 10F, supra note 14 (rejecting the 
proposals on adopting MDP and disbanding the Commission). 
128. Terry, supra note 126, at 2-18 (stating that in 1999 the ABA recommended 
the allowance of MDP, along with its opinion on how to implement and regulate it); 
ABA Comm’n on Multidisciplinary Practice, ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary 
Practice Report to the House of Delegates (June 1999) (arguing that a lawyer should be 
able to work in an ALPS). 
129. Terry, supra note 126, at 2-18 (explaining that the ABA recommended, in 
May 2000, that lawyers be allowed to partner with non-lawyers, but omitted suggestions 
on how to implement ALPS); ABA Comm’n on Multidisciplinary Practice, ABA 
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice Report to the House of Delegates 1 (May 
2000) [hereinafter MDP Report 2000] (stating that the profession should implement 
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ultimately unsuccessful, its work prompted states to research 
ALPS and consider the issue.130 
A decade after the Commission on Multidisciplinary 
Practice failed to implement any amendments to the Model 
Rules, concerns over the future effects of globalization and 
technological innovation led the ABA to re-open the ALPS 
debate during the 20/20 Commission.131 This time, the ABA did 
not even recommend any changes on the topic.132 Thus, the 
Model Rules still prohibit all forms of ALPS, as do all fifty 
states.133  
                                                                                                             
ALPS and that “[r]egulatory authorities should enforce existing rules and adopt such 
additional enforcement procedures as are needed to implement these principles and 
to protect the public interest”). 
130. Terry, supra note 126, at 2-20 (“Despite the ABA House of Delegates’ 
rejection of both recommendations submitted by the ABA Commission . . . state and 
local bar associations . . . engaged in an examination of the MDP issue.”); ABA 
Comm’n on Multidisciplinary Practice, ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice 
Summary of State MDP Activity Chart (updated Jan. 18, 2005) (providing descriptions 
of state efforts to study MDPs). 
131. See Ethics 20/20 Final Report, supra note 123, at 8 (2012) (stating that the 
ABA asked the Commission to study the effects of globalization on US legal practice); 
see also ABA Ethics Comm’n 20/20 Issue Paper Concerning Alternative Business 
Structures 2 (Apr. 5, 2011) [hereinafter April ABS Paper], available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics/2020/absissues
paper.authcheckdam.pdf (explaining that globalization and the state of the economy 
“invite reconsideration of whether ABS might serve to enhance access to legal services 
for those otherwise unable to afford them, and to provide new and varied opportunities 
for lawyers and firms domestically to better serve clients”). 
132. December ALPS Paper, supra note 4, at 2 (explaining that the ABA decided 
not to recommend a change in policy on non-lawyer ownership); Schneyer, supra note 
13, at 79–81 (explaining that the Commission did not recommend any amendments to 
Model Rule 5.4 because, despite some positive response, members of the profession 
showed strong resistance to allowing ALPS). 
133. Gillers, supra note 8, at n.68 (stating that every US jurisdiction besides 
Washington, D.C. forbids non-lawyer ownership and management of law firms); MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a) (subject to limited exceptions, “a lawyer or law 
firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer”); id. R. 5.4(b) (“A lawyer shall not 
form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of 
the practice of law.”); id. R. 5.4(c) (“A lawyer shall not permit a person who 
recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct 
or regulate the lawyer’s professional judgment in rendering such legal services.”); id. R 
5.4(d) (“A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or 
association authorized to practice law for a profit, if: (1) a nonlawyer owns any interest 
therein, except that a fiduciary representative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the 
stock or interest of the lawyer for a reasonable time during administration; (2) a 
nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof or occupies the position of similar 
responsibility in any form of association other than a corporation; or (3) a nonlawyer 
has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer”). 
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Before the ABA decided to abandon the topic, the Working 
Group on Alternative Business Structures (the “Working 
Group”) studied possible amendments to Model Rule 5.4’s 
prohibition on sharing fees with non-lawyers.134 It considered 
five possible forms of revision to Model Rule 5.4 before deciding 
not to propose any changes.135 
The Working Group first rejected law firms wholly or 
partially owned by passive investors, law firms that raise capital 
by issuing stock to outsiders, and multidisciplinary practices, or 
firms with active lawyer- and non-lawyer-owners providing 
services to their own clients.136 However, the ABA gave more 
consideration to allowing law firms owned partially by non-
lawyers who aid in the provision of legal services. 137  The 
Working Group created a Draft Resolution for this option, 
influenced by the approach of the Washington, D.C. Bar, which 
allows non-lawyers to own or manage law firms that solely 
provide legal services, if the non-lawyers agree to be bound by 
the ethical rules governing lawyers, and the firm’s attorneys 
agree to take responsibility for non-lawyers’ conduct.138 The 
                                                                                                             
134. Schneyer, supra note 13, at 78–79 (describing the Working Group’s task of 
researching whether the profession could maintain its “core values” while also 
implementing ALPS); April ABS Paper, supra note 131, at 1 (explaining that the 
Working Group considered whether ALPS would allow law firms to provide better 
client service). 
135. See April ABS Paper, supra note 131, at 17–19 (explaining that the Working 
Group focused on: “Limited Lawyer/Nonlawyer Partnerships with a Cap on Nonlawyer 
Ownership”; “Lawyer/Nonlawyer Partnerships with No Cap on Nonlawyers Ownership 
(The D.C. Approach)”; “MDPs that Offer Non-Legal Services”; “Endorsing Outside 
Investment”; and “The Australia Model”); Schneyer, supra note 13, at 79 (describing 
the multiple possibilities the Working Group explored before abandoning the prospect 
of amending Model Rule 5.4). 
136. See December ALPS Paper, supra note 4, at 1 (“[T]he Commission rejected: 
(a) publicly traded law firms, (b) passive, outside nonlawyer investment or ownership 
in law firms, and (c) multidisciplinary practices.”); Schneyer, supra note 13, at 79–81 
(explaining that the ABA had eliminated the possibilities of allowing publicly traded 
law firms, outside investment by non-lawyers, and MDPs). 
137. December ALPS paper, supra note 4, at 2 (explaining that “the sole purpose 
of such a law firm must be the delivery of legal services and . . . the services provided by 
nonlawyers must be limited to assisting the lawyers in the delivery of those legal 
services”); Schneyer, supra note 13, at 80–81 (explaining that the Working Group 
produced a Draft Resolution and circulated a Draft Report for this option). 
138. D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2012) (providing, inter alia, that: 
“(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that . . . (4) 
Sharing of fees is permitted in a partnership or other form of organization which meets 
the requirements of paragraph (b) . . . [which states that] A lawyer may practice in a 
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option the Working Group considered included two additional 
restrictions: a cap on non-lawyer ownership and a character 
assessment of non-lawyer owners.139  Ultimately, however, the 
Working Group found that the reasons proffered in opposition 
trumped those favoring amendment.140 
B. The Current Regulatory Climate for Lawyers in the European Union 
and the United States 
As discussed above, globalization and ever-advancing 
technology have created new debates, and increased the size and 
scope of others, related to the proper extent of professional 
regulations in both the European Union and the United 
States.141 Part I.B.1 of this Note discusses the current regulatory 
system in the European Union, focusing on the liberal rules 
regarding MJP and ALPS. Part I.B.2 provides a comparative 
                                                                                                             
partnership or other form of organization in which a financial interest is held or 
managerial authority is exercised by an individual nonlawyer who performs 
professional services which assist the organization in providing legal services to clients, 
but only if: (1) The partnership or organization has as its sole purpose providing legal 
services to clients; (2) All persons having such managerial authority or holding a 
financial interest undertake to abide by these Rules of Professional Conduct; (3) The 
lawyers who have a financial interest or managerial authority in the partnership or 
organization undertake to be responsible for the nonlawyer participants [i.e., owners] 
to the same extent as if nonlawyer participants were lawyers under Rule 5.1; [and] (4) 
The foregoing conditions are set forth in writing.”); December ALPS Paper, supra note 
4, at 2 (explaining that, under the D.C. model, “alternative law practice structures are 
not multidisciplinary practice by another name” because they are limited to providing 
legal services, and lawyers are responsible for assuring non-lawyers’ compliance with 
ethical rules). 
139. Schneyer, supra note 13, at 80–81 (explaining that the Draft Resolution was 
based on a combination of the Washington, D.C. model, a limit on the percentage of 
ownership non-lawyers may hold, and a character requirement for non-lawyer owners); 
December ALPS Paper, supra note 4, at 2 (“[Under the Draft Proposal’s approach,] 
lawyers would have to maintain the controlling financial interest and voting rights in 
the law firm [and] investigate [a] non-lawyer’s professional reputation for integrity.”). 
140. Schneyer, supra note 13, at 82–83 (explaining that the Commission did not 
recommend any changes to Model Rule 5.4 because negative reactions far 
outnumbered positive ones); Press Release, ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 Will Not 
Propose Any Changes to ABA Policy Prohibiting Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Firms 
(Apr. 16, 2012) (“[T]here does not appear to be a sufficient basis for recommending a 
change to ABA policy on nonlawyer ownership of law firms.”). 
141. Wald, supra note 12, at 506 (discussing that state-by-state regulations are 
increasingly mismatched with national practice). See generally Paton, supra note 4 
(summarizing the extensive history of the ALPS debate). 
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description of the more restrictive rules governing US lawyers’ 
ability to engage in MJP and ALPS. 
1. The European Union: Established Free Movement of Lawyers 
and Gradual Implementation of Alternative Legal Practice 
Structures 
Lawyers in the European Union are increasingly free of 
restrictions on their practice.142 Twentieth century ECJ decisions 
and EU legislation firmly created interstate practice rights for 
both temporary and permanent MJP, and national controls over 
the profession have continued to decrease in recent years.143 
This section describes the current regulatory system in the 
European Union and trends toward de-regulation. 
Member States have responded to the ideas spread by the 
European Commission with legislation removing restrictions.144 
In Italy, for example, the Bersani Decree liberalized several 
areas of legal regulation, including reducing tariffs to facilitate 
access and loosening restrictions on multidisciplinary 
partnerships.145 
The Lawyers’ Services Directive and the Lawyers’ 
Establishment Directive, along with the Diploma Directive which 
covers the liberal professions more generally, allow lawyers and 
law firms to provide services on a temporary and permanent 
basis throughout the European Union.146 Due to the national 
                                                                                                             
142. EU REPORT, supra note 1, at 5 (discussing how EU directives have led to 
large-scale lawyer mobility); Goldsmith, supra note 50, at 442–43 (discussing recent 
liberalizing legislation in Denmark, the UK, and Italy). 
143. Goebel, supra note 10, at 308 (“[L]awyers are able to carry on freely modern 
international legal practice throughout most of Europe.”); Goldsmith, supra note 50, at 
442 (explaining that the European Union has, in the last few years, reduced control 
over lawyers). 
144. See Goldsmith, supra note 50, at 443 (“[T]he European Commission . . . has 
been deliberately spreading certain ideas to all corners of the European Union.”); 
Paton, supra note 4, at 2197 (describing the UK’s 2007 Legal Services Act, which 
authorizes ALPS). 
145. The Bersani Decree-Law of 4 July 2006 (transposed into law on 4 August 
2006) (liberalizing professional regulation in Italy); Goldsmith, supra note 50, at 442–
43 (explaining the impact of the Bersani Decree). 
146. EU REPORT, supra note 1, at 16 (“[Along with the Diploma Recognition 
Directive, which covers the professions generally, the] profession of lawyer is . . . 
covered by . . . the Lawyers’ Services Directive and the Lawyers’ Establishment 
Directive.”); see Lonbay, supra note 1, at 1641–44 (describing the three directives as the 
most important legislation relating to the free movement of lawyers). 
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nature of the legal profession, however, Member States retain 
control over lawyers that is unique among the professions.147 
Thus, Member States impose certain requirements, such as rules 
requiring foreign lawyers to work with local lawyers on certain 
matters and to comply with administrative requirements.148 
This framework has greatly impacted the legal profession in 
the European Union.149 There is a large market for lawyers who 
provide services temporarily under the Lawyers’ Services 
Directive, either physically or virtually.150 Regarding permanent 
practice, the Lawyers’ Establishment Directive and the Diploma 
Recognition Directive have allowed many lawyers to establish 
themselves outside their Home State.151 
Lawyer mobility has thus had a large economic impact.152 
Additionally, it has affected the availability of a broader range of 
legal services, and many lawyers perceive some increase in 
competition. 153  Although some foreign lawyers experience 
competitive disadvantages or confusion over choice of 
                                                                                                             
147. EU REPORT, supra note 1, at 5 (“[T]he profession of lawyer is specifically 
targeted to and based on the national legal systems in which prospective lawyers train 
and fully qualified lawyers practise.”); see Lawyers’ Establishment Directive, supra note 
33 (providing for a system of establishment specifically for lawyers). 
148. EU REPORT, supra note 1, at 79, tbl. 3.1 (providing Member States’ versions 
of the requirement that a foreign lawyer work with a local lawyer); Lawyers’ 
Establishment Directive, supra note 33, art. 3, at 38–39 (requiring foreign lawyers to 
register with the Host State’s competent authority). 
149. EU REPORT, supra note 1, at 175 (“[Lawyer mobility affects] meeting the 
needs of clients of legal services in cross-border cases . . . the European economy, and 
. . . the quality of legal services offered.”); Lonbay, supra note 1, at 1640 (characterizing 
the EU’s free practice rights as “dramatic”). 
150. EU REPORT, supra note 1, at 7 (describing the prevalence of temporary 
interstate practice); id. at 122 (“[L]awyers may provide services to clients in other 
countries . . . by telephone and/or e-mail.”). 
151. EU REPORT, supra note 1, at 7 (stating that about 3500 lawyers have 
established themselves outside their Home State under the Lawyers’ Establishment 
Directive); id. (estimating that between 200 and 300 lawyers have fully integrated into 
the profession in foreign Member State). 
152. EU REPORT, supra note 1, at 8 (reporting that lawyers established outside 
their Home State account for about EU€640 million in turnover each year); 
COPENHAGEN ECONOMICS, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: COMPETITION AND LIBERALISATION 
6 (Jan. 2006) [hereinafter COPENHAGEN REPORT] (“The legal profession is of great 
importance to the economy.”). 
153. EU REPORT, supra note 1, at 9 (“[T]he most commonly perceived effect of 
lawyer mobility is an increase in the range of legal services that is offered . . . [and] 
relatively many lawyers perceive an increase in competition pressure because of cross-
border mobility of lawyers.”); COPENHAGEN REPORT, supra note 152, at 4 (explaining 
that liberalization leads to increased competition, which can benefit consumers). 
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regulations, lawyers nonetheless continue to practice in large 
numbers throughout the European Union.154  
Additionally, national regulations regarding business 
structures in the legal profession have recently effected major 
changes in some Member States’ regulation of lawyers.155 Some 
Member States allow non-lawyers to partner with lawyers or to 
participate in ownership or management of law firms.156 
The Member State reform that has attracted the most 
attention is the United Kingdom’s decision to embrace ALPS 
after conducting research on consumer preferences and 
needs. 157  The United Kingdom’s 2007 Legal Services Act 
implemented many significant changes, placing regulatory 
control of the profession in the Legal Services Board and the 
Office for Legal Complaints, and declaring that a majority of 
members of both entities must be non-lawyers.158 Furthermore, 
the Act permits the Board to consider new business models, 
based on the view that the market will benefit from legal advice 
offered with other business services.159 
                                                                                                             
154. See infra notes 218–20 and accompanying text. 
155. EU REPORT, supra note 1, at 10 (“[D]evelopments in relation to business 
structures are especially relevant for cross-border mobility of lawyers and law firms.”); 
Goldsmith, supra note 50, at 442 (describing dramatic changes in Member State control 
of legal practice). 
156. EU REPORT, supra note 1, at 206 (explaining that some Member States now 
allow ALPS); see Ramon Mullerat, The Multidisciplinary Practice of Law in Europe, 50 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 481, 484–90 (2000) (describing ALPS rules in several EU countries). 
157. Legal Services Act of 2007 (Eng.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2007/29/contents (enacting a new regulatory scheme); Julian Webb, Regulating 
Lawyers in a Liberalized Legal Services Market: The Role of Education and Training, 24 STAN. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 533, 533 (stating that the reforms in the UK have drawn widespread 
interest). 
158. Legal Services Act 2007, pt. 2, at 2–11 (describing the new Legal Services 
Board); Terry, supra note 77, at 10 (“[T]he Act changes the regulatory structure for 
solicitors and barristers in England and Wales by creating a Legal Services Board and 
an Office for Legal Complaints, both of which require a majority of members who are 
not lawyers.”). 
159. SIR DAVID CLEMENTI, REVIEW OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR LEGAL 
SERVICES IN ENGLAND AND WALES: FINAL PAPER 6 (Dec. 2004), available at 
http://www.legal-services-review.org.uk/content/report/report-chap.pdf (“[When] 
developing business systems to minimise costs whilst maintaining high standards, there 
is no reason why lawyers should not work alongside those with other skills . . . .”); Legal 
Services Act 2007, pt. 5, at 42–64 (providing for regulation of newly allowed activities). 
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Accordingly, there are now several types of alternative legal 
practice structures allowed in the United Kingdom.160 These 
include legal firms owned by passive investors, firms that issue 
stock to non-lawyers to raise capital, multidisciplinary practices, 
and firms owned, in part, by non-lawyers but limited to 
providing legal services.161 
Other Member States that permit lawyers to practice with 
non-lawyers in multidisciplinary partnerships, usually with some 
restrictions, include Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, and 
Spain.162 Furthermore, England, Wales, Scotland, Italy, Spain, 
Denmark, and the Netherlands allow non-lawyer ownership or 
management, with various restrictions on their involvement.163 
2. Controversy in the United States over Liberalization of Rules 
on Multijurisdictional Practice and Alternative Legal Practice 
Structures 
In the United States, the ABA Model Rules greatly impact 
state regulation of lawyers; although they are not mandatory, 
many states implement similar or identical rules.164 Thus, the 
Model Rules’ provision of only limited exceptions to the 
requirement that a lawyer practice only within their Bar State is 
largely incorporated throughout the United States, with little 
                                                                                                             
160. See Schneyer, supra note 13, at 79 (discussing the five kinds of ALPS that are 
now allowed in the United Kingdom); The Law Society, Alternative Business Structures, 
§ 2 What is an ABS? (July 22, 2013), http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/advice/practice-
notes/alternative-business-structures/ (explaining that the UK now allows a firm where 
a non-lawyer manages, or has an ownership interest in, a law firm). 
161. See Schneyer, supra note 13, at 79 (summarizing the ABA’s consideration of 
these five structures); April ABS Paper, supra note 131, at 13 (“Under the [Legal 
Services Act], alternative business structures are defined as entities that have lawyer and 
nonlawyer management and/or ownership and that provide only legal services or legal 
services in combination with non-legal services.”). 
162. EU REPORT, supra note 1, at 206 (explaining that France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and the UK permit MDPs). See generally Terry, supra note 7 
(describing Germany’s long history of allowing multidisciplinary practice). 
163. EU REPORT, supra note 1, at 206 (“External ownership . . . has been made 
possible in England and Wales (up to 100% for solicitor firms), Scotland (up to 49%), 
Italy (33%) . . . Spain (49%) . . . . [and] Denmark . . . (10%). In the Netherlands, 
ownership by non-lawyers is not possible, but minority non-lawyer management is 
permitted.”); see, e.g., Legal Services Act 2007, pt. 5, at 42–64 (describing the types of 
ALPS allowed in the United Kingdom). 
164. See Goebel, supra note 10, at 324 (explaining that the Model Rules are 
adopted by most states); Wald, supra note 12, at 500 (stating that most states follow the 
Model Rules). 
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deviation.165 Furthermore, all fifty states prohibit lawyers from 
sharing fees with non-lawyers, in large part due to the ABA’s 
steadfast refusal to amend Model Rule 5.4. 166  This section 
discusses the details and impact of these rules. 
Under the Model Rules, and throughout the United States, 
in most situations lawyers cannot practice outside of their Bar 
State.167 However, four exceptions to this prohibition listed in 
Model Rule 5.5 allow lawyers to provide multijurisdictional legal 
services on a “temporary basis.”168 Thus, lawyers can provide 
these legal services if they collaborate with a lawyer qualified in 
that jurisdiction.169 They can also engage in MJP if they have 
received pro hac vice admission for the matter under 
consideration or one “reasonably related” to it.170 Furthermore, 
a lawyer can practice in ways “reasonably related” to alternative 
dispute resolution.171 Finally, a lawyer may offer services that 
                                                                                                             
165. See Wald, supra note 12, at 499 (describing Model Rule 5.5 as a “nearly 
uniformly adopted rule of professional conduct”); Am. Bar Ass’n, Comparison of ABA 
Model Rule on Admission by Motion with State Versions (2010) [hereinafter Motion 
Admission Comparison], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
migrated/cpr/mjp/admission_motion_comp.authcheckdam.pdf (comparing 
similarities between states’ implementation of the Model Rule on Admission). 
166. See supra notes 126–48 and accompanying text. 
167. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (prohibiting MJP except in a few 
limited situations); Wald, supra note 12, at 502 (“The state-based regulatory approach 
. . . generally restricts the practice of law within state jurisdictional lines and deems 
practice in a state without a license the unauthorized practice of law.”). 
168 . MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(c)(1)–(4) (providing four 
situations where “[a] lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not 
disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services on 
a temporary basis in this jurisdiction”); Wald, supra note 12, at 503 (stating that Model 
Rule 5.5(c) is a possible path to national practice rules). 
169. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(c)(1)(providing that a lawyer may 
engage in MJP if he works with a locally qualified lawyer); Wald, supra note 12, at 503–
04 (“Subsection 5.5(c)(1) permits a state A lawyer to offer legal services in state B that 
are undertaken in association with a[n actively participating] state B lawyer.”). 
170. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(c)(2) (allowing foreign lawyers to 
participate in authorized proceedings, or work on related matters); Wald, supra note 
12, at 504-505 (explaining that this section corresponds with pro hac vice admission). 
All states allow some form of pro hac vice admission. 2002 MJP Report, supra note 3, at 
10 (stating that every jurisdiction permits pro hac vice admission of out-of-state lawyers 
appearing before a tribunal, although the processes and standards for pro hac vice 
admission differ). 
171. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(c)(3) (authorizing lawyers to 
participate in alternative dispute resolution and practice in related ways); Wald, supra 
note 12, at 505 (explaining that subsection 5.5(c)(3) allows multijurisdictional practice 
in arbitration, mediation, or similar proceedings). 
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“arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice” 
in their Bar State.172 
However, Colorado takes a more liberal approach: it allows 
an “out-of-state attorney” to offer temporary legal services there, 
but places restrictions on certain types of practice, like 
litigation.173 In order to be a valid out-of-state attorney, the 
lawyer must be licensed in another state and be in good 
standing in all courts and jurisdictions in which he or she is 
admitted.174 Additionally, the provision requires that out-of-state 
attorneys not have a domicile in Colorado, nor an office from 
which the lawyer solicits Colorado clients.175 It also subjects out-
of-state attorneys to Colorado’s ethical rules.176 
The Model Rule on Admission by Motion provides that an 
attorney licensed to practice law in a US jurisdiction who meets 
certain requirements may obtain admission in another state 
without taking that state’s bar exam.177  This rule has been 
implemented in some form in all but eleven states.178 
                                                                                                             
172 . MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(c)(4) (allowing a lawyer to 
perform tasks that “arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in a 
jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice”); Wald, supra note 12, at 505–
06 (explaining that this rule allows lawyers to provide services where a “factual or legal 
nexus exists to the lawyer’s practice” in their Home State). 
173. Colo. R. Civ. P § 220(2) (allowing out-of-state lawyers to practice in Colorado 
but requiring pro hac vice admission for appearance in a court or tribunal”); Wald, 
supra note 12, at 532 (explaining that Colorado’s approach allows out-of-state lawyers to 
provide services outside of courtroom litigation, including transactional counseling). 
174. Colo. R. Civ. P § 220(1) (defining an out-of-state attorney as one who: (a) is 
licensed and active in a US jurisdiction; (b) has not lost his good standing in any 
jurisdiction where he is licensed; (c) has not established a domicile in Colorado; and 
(d) does solicit, accept, or deceive Colorado clients from an office for regular law 
practice); Wald, supra note 12, at 532–33 (describing the requirements of Colo. R. Civ. 
P § 220(1)). 
175. See Colo. R. Civ. P § 220(1)(c)–(d) (prohibiting out-of-state attorneys to 
practice if they are domiciled in Colorado or have a Colorado office used to solicit 
Colorado clients); Wald, supra note 12, at 532 (describing the requirements of Colo. R. 
Civ. P § 220(1)). 
176. Colo. R. Civ. P § 220(3) (“An out-of-state attorney practicing law under this 
rule is subject to the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct and rules of procedure 
regarding attorney discipline and disability proceedings and . . . remedies . . . .”); Wald, 
supra note 12, at 533 (explaining that out-of-state lawyers must comply with Colorado’s 
ethical rules). 
177. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT RULE ON ADMISSION BY MOTION (2012) 
(“An applicant who meets the requirements of (a) through (g) of this Rule may, upon 
motion, be admitted to the practice of law in this jurisdiction. The applicant shall:͒(a) 
have been admitted to practice law in another state, territory, ͒or the District of 
Columbia;͒(b) hold a first professional degree in law (J.D. or LL.B.) from a law school 
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In contrast to the ABA’s willingness to show some 
relaxation of the rules on MJP, the ABA’s two studies of ALPS 
did not result in any changes to the Model Rules.179 Model Rule 
5.4 therefore does not allow lawyers to share fees with non-
lawyers, and this prohibition persists in all fifty states.180 Thus, 
multidisciplinary practices are not allowed, nor is ownership of 
law firms by non-lawyers.181  
In Washington, D.C., however, attorneys may practice with 
non-lawyers.182 There, lawyers may work in ALPS with other 
professionals so long as the purpose of the practice is to provide 
legal services.183 If a Washington, D.C. lawyer works with a lawyer 
from one of the fifty states and the attorneys jointly bill a client, 
the fact that the US lawyer may eventually share fees with a non-
lawyer does not mean that he violates his ethical duties.184 The 
                                                                                                             
approved by the Council of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar 
of the American Bar Association at the time the graduate matriculated;͒(c) have been 
primarily engaged in the active practice of law in one or more states, territories or the 
District of Columbia for five of the seven years immediately preceding the date upon 
which the application is filed;͒(d) establish that the applicant is currently a member in 
good standing in all jurisdictions where admitted;͒(e) establish that the applicant is not 
currently subject to lawyer discipline or the subject of a pending disciplinary matter in 
any other jurisdiction;͒(f) establish that the applicant possesses the character and 
fitness to practice law in this jurisdiction; and͒(g) designate the Clerk of the 
jurisdiction’s highest court for service of process.”); Wald, supra note 12, at 499 
(explaining that the Model Rule on Admission by Motion allows attorneys who satisfy 
certain criteria to practice outside their Bar State). 
178 . See Motion Admission Comparison, supra note 165 (summarizing state 
implementation of the Model Rule on Admission by Motion and noting that California, 
Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maryland, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, and South Carolina have not implemented admission by motion); see, e.g., 
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 705 (“Any person who, as determined by the Board of 
Admissions to the Bar, has been licensed to practice in the highest court of law in any 
United States state, territory, or the District of Columbia for no fewer than five years 
may be eligible for admission on motion . . . .”). 
179. See supra notes 126–33 and accompanying text. 
180. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
181. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
182. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
183. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
184. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 464 (2013) 
(“Where there is a single billing to a client . . . a lawyer subject to the Model Rules may 
divide a legal fee with a lawyer or law firm in the other jurisdiction, even if the other 
lawyer or law firm might eventually distribute some portion of the fee to a nonlawyer, 
provided that there is no interference with the lawyer’s independent professional 
judgment.”); PHILA. BAR ASSN. PROF’L GUIDANCE COMM., ADVISORY OP. 2010-7 (2010) 
(concluding that a law firm that represented a client jointly with a D.C. firm that has a 
non-lawyer partner could share the fee). 
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principle applies whether the lawyer who can share fees with 
non-lawyers is from Washington D.C., or a foreign jurisdiction 
that allows ALPS.185 
Although the concerns underlying US opposition to 
removing or reducing restrictions on MJP and ALPS are deep-
seeded and widely accepted, a growing number of US attorneys 
now hope for at least some reform.186 The intensity of the 
debates surrounding the ABA’s consideration of MJP and ALPS 
show that both sides’ adherents remain committed to their 
positions.187 This leads to the perception that liberalization is 
inapposite to the profession’s core values, but also prompts 
some members of the US legal profession to discover ways that 
the two can, and should, co-exist.188  
II. EMBRACING PROGRESS AND GUARDING TRADITIONAL 
VALUES: THE US DEBATE ABOUT PROPER AND WISE 
LAWYER REGULATION 
As the European Union continues to see reform on both 
institutional and national levels, the growing gap between EU 
and US rules leads many US lawyers to push the profession 
harder to catch up.189 This movement, however, continues to 
meet steadfast opposition by US attorneys citing tradition and 
core values.190 Part II.A of this Note summarizes the arguments 
proffered by US lawyers in favor of allowing MJP, including 
successful implementation abroad, as well as the reasons 
opponents of reform cite for adhering to traditional state-by-
state regulation. Part II.B examines the longstanding debate 
over ALPS, comparing the reasons many claim its 
implementation is both inevitable and favorable with those given 
for unwavering adherence to the traditional law firm structure. 
                                                                                                             
185. See supra text accompanying note 184. 
186. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
187. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
188. Green, supra note 17, at 1146 (explaining that the core values argument 
assumes that lawyers and their rules are “better” than other professionals and their 
rules, that non-lawyers are corrupt and will taint lawyers’ practices, and that legal ethics 
cannot be changed); supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
189. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
190. Letter from Richard L. Thies to ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20 (Feb. 23, 
2012) (on file with author) . 
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A. Can Multijurisdictional Practice Reconcile Lawyer Regulation with 
Legal Practice in the United States? 
As discussed above, MJP is allowed on a far more liberal 
basis in the European Union than in the United States.191 EU 
lawyers and law firms provide services both temporarily and on a 
permanent basis throughout the European Union. 192  In 
contrast, US lawyers may practice outside their Bar State only in 
limited circumstances. 193  While many US lawyers argue that 
multijurisdictional practice rules should be reduced or 
eliminated, others stand firm in the belief that the profession 
will suffer if the state-based-regulation tradition is abandoned. 
Part I.A.1 describes the arguments for liberalizing the MJP rules 
in the United States. Part I.A.2 summarizes the opposing 
position. Finally, Part I.A.3 provides a description of some of the 
solutions proponents of reform propose. 
1. Multijurisdictional Practice in the United States Will Benefit 
Lawyers, Clients, and the Profession at Large 
There is a growing body of scholarship and case law arguing 
that the rules of MJP in the United States should be relaxed.194 
This section will describe some of the reasons proffered for 
reform, including market considerations, client demand, the 
need for regulation that “fits” with practice, and successful 
implementation of liberal practice rules in the European 
Union.195 
Many US lawyers point out that allowing increased MJP 
would make the provision of legal services in the United States 
                                                                                                             
191. See supra notes 142–63 and accompanying text; cf. supra notes 164–88 and 
accompanying text. 
192. See supra notes 142–63 and accompanying text. 
193. See supra notes 164–88 and accompanying text. 
194. See Wald, supra note 12, at 491–92 (“[State-by-state regulation is] outdated 
and increasingly inconsistent with practice realities.”); In re Estate of Waring, 221 A.2d 
193, 197 (N.J. 1966) (“While the members of the general public are entitled to full 
protection against unlawful practitioners, their freedom of choice in the selection of 
their own counsel is to be highly regarded . . . .”). 
195. See Gillers, supra note 8, at 953 (explaining that the growth of virtual practice 
requires changes to the Model Rules); Wald, supra note 12, at 492–93 (describing the 
arguments for a national system of lawyer regulation and their particular importance in 
the twenty-first century). 
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more efficient.196 Service by an attorney familiar with the facts of 
a case or with special expertise relevant to the matter, regardless 
of their Home State or Bar State, is more efficient than 
requiring a lawyer from the Host State to take over.197 
Technological innovation and globalization, proponents of 
reform argue, render the current regulation of MJP outdated, if 
not obsolete.198 Consumers’ ability, through the internet, to fully 
understand their options in choosing a lawyer allows them to 
look for a price they find acceptable, or search for a specific 
specialization.199 One implication of this transparency is the 
ability to find an attorney who is located out of state or even out 
of the country.200 The Internet also allows lawyers to target and 
serve clients outside of their physical proximity.201 Thus, some 
                                                                                                             
196. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335, 342–
43 (1994) (“[A national regulation system would be more efficient because] practices 
of both multistate law firms and less ambitious practitioners . . . have become national 
in nature.”). See generally Wald, supra note 12 (offering societal explanations for why 
change is necessary). 
197. See Mary C. Daly, Resolving Ethical Conflicts in Multijurisdictional Practice, 36 S. 
TEX. L. REV. 715, 725 (1995) (explaining that as lawyers become more likely to 
specialize, clients increasingly hire national experts); Goebel, supra note 10, at 340 
(“The ability to use the same qualified counsel, particularly when parallel transactions 
are undertaken in a number of states, undoubtedly represents a considerable cost-
saving and a substantial enhancement of efficiency for modem clients.”). 
198. See Gillers, supra note 8, at 953 (“The traditional geocentric [regulation] 
model . . . is unstable today . . . .”); Zacharias, supra note 196, at 344 (“[C]urrent ethics 
codes may no longer be effective.”). 
199. See ABA Comm. on the Delivery of Legal Servs., Perspective on Finding 
Personal Legal Services, The Results of a Public Opinion Poll, 14 (2011) [hereinafter 
Finding Legal Services] (reporting that 47% of those surveyed are likely to browse 
websites where lawyers are rated); Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, A Fork in the Road: The 
Intersection of Virtual Law Practice and Social Media, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 267, 276 (2013) 
(“Consumers increasingly search the Internet, including social media pages, to inform 
themselves about [legal] products and services.”). 
200. See Browne-Barbour, supra note 199, at 278–79 (emphasizing the importance 
of a lawyer’s ability to use the Internet to talk with people throughout the world); 
Gillers, supra note 8, at 997 (explaining that, with the help of the Internet, 
“specialization is increasingly defined by expertise in areas of law”). 
201 . See Wald, supra note 12, at 495 (“[T]echnological advances have 
revolutionized the practice of law, making it much easier to practice law nationally, 
from research tools that make studying law and gaining competence nationally quick, 
easy, and relatively cheap, to advances that allow lawyers to be virtually present 
everywhere.”); cf. Finding Legal Services, supra note 199, at 15 (stating that lawyers have 
used websites to develop client relationships since the 1990s). 
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argue that the rigid state system may compromise the client’s 
interest in choosing their own representation.202 
Aside from wanting more control over their choice of 
representation, proponents argue, many clients now truly need 
more geographically widespread counsel.203 Technology creates 
more mobile clients, who have multijurisdictional issues.204 As 
corporations grow and become more geographically diverse, 
their needs spread.205 Recent years have, somewhat resultantly, 
brought huge amounts of multi-office and international law 
firms that cross state and national borders.206 
However, the rules of MJP lag behind the purported supply 
and demand for it; although clients want more mobile lawyers 
and lawyers are available to provide interstate services, the 
practice remains difficult. 207  As matters become increasingly 
geographically widespread without simultaneous development 
                                                                                                             
202. See Goebel, supra note 10, at 338 (explaining that the EU model better serves 
clients interests, especially the right to choose one’s own lawyer); Charles W. Wolfram, 
Sneaking Around in the Legal Profession: Interjurisdictional Unauthorized Practice by 
Transactional Lawyers, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 665, 712 (1995) (“[T]he client would be better 
served by legal services provided by familiar, regular counsel or counsel particularly 
skilled in dealing with a particular specialty.”). 
203. See Wald, supra note 12, at 494–95 (explaining the ways that clients receive 
better service where lawyers span jurisdictions); Zacharias, supra note 196, at 352 
(describing the globalized nature of client needs). 
204. See Wald, supra note 12, at 494–95 (explaining that MJP is necessary because 
national clients’ interests are geographically widespread); Zacharias, supra note 196, at 
352 (“When national lawyers represent or sue national corporations . . . [they] may 
find an issue simultaneously governed by the codes in [many states].”). 
205. See James R. Faulconbridge, Jonathan V. Beaverstock, Daniel Muzio & Peter 
J. Taylor, Global Law Firms: Globalization and Organizational Spaces of Cross-Border Legal 
Work, 28 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 455, 455 (2008) (explaining that clients expanded 
throughout world in the 1980s and 1990s); Wald, supra note 12, at 497 (“A national . . . 
[or] international client, may have legal needs in multiple jurisdictions . . . .”). 
206. See Faulconbridge et al., supra note 205, at 455 (describing the prevalence 
and importance of global law firms); Wald, supra note 12, at 497 (“[Representing large 
clients can] inherently entail practice across state lines and cooperation among firm 
lawyers in multiple offices nationwide and worldwide.”). 
207. See Wald, supra note 12, at 498 (explaining that the persistence of state-based 
regulation is problematic because national and global law practice is here to stay). See 
generally Stephanie L. Kimbro, Practicing Law Without an Office Address: How the Bona Fide 
Office Requirement Affects Virtual Law Practice, 36 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1 (2010) 
(summarizing the difficulties associated with location-based regulation in a virtual 
world). 
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for lawyer regulation, the profession as a whole suffers. 208 
Allowing efficiency costs to hinder the successful operation of 
the system may place the United States at a disadvantage when a 
client considers whether to hire a lawyer from the United States 
or elsewhere.209 Thus, proponents of reform argue that the 
status quo will lead to a continuously less profitable US system.210 
Additionally, some US attorneys argue that a regulatory 
system based on physical location is, in many ways, an odd fit 
with a legal field where much of the activity regulated now 
occurs on the Internet, and involves collaboration across 
physical and industry borders. 211  The ability of lawyers to 
communicate, research, access client records, and perform 
many other duties from anywhere gives them the ability to 
choose their location. 212  A growing trend whereby lawyers 
choose to work far from their physical practice, or without a 
physical practice at all, has caused the line between what does or 
does not violate jurisdictional rules to become very blurred.213 
                                                                                                             
208. Goebel, supra note 10, at 336 (explaining that interstate legal practice may 
better serve modern client needs and reduce efficiency costs); Wald, supra note 12, at 
494-95 (“[C]lient needs have dictated an expansion in cross-state practices.”). 
209. John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice and the 
American Legal Profession: A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services in 
the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 205–06 (2000) [hereinafter MDP 
Market Approach] (predicting that clients will take their business outside the United 
States if the ethical rules don’t keep up with client demand); Stephen M. (Pete) 
Peterson, Too Many Lawyers? . . . or Not Enough Clients?, 36. WYO. LAW., Jun, 2013 at 44 
(2013) (“For the foreseeable future, we will have a buyer’s market for legal services.”). 
210. Adams & Matheson, supra note 124, at 1 (“[P]rohibitions against nonlawyer 
investment and participation in law firms have long hindered the legal profession with 
no signs of change.”). See generally MDP Market Approach, supra note 209 (arguing, 
based on economic theories, that allowing ALPS will benefit the profession). 
211. See Gillers, supra note 8, at 956 (explaining that developments in how lawyers 
actually practice throughout the world “will marginalize the effectiveness of regulation” 
if the ALPS ban persists); Kimbro, supra note 207, at 3 (“Recent changes to the legal 
profession due to the globalization of law firms, trends in outsourcing of legal services, 
and the public demand for online legal services all indicate the need for a wider variety 
of law practice management structures . . . .”). 
212. See Gillers, supra note 8, at 978–79 (stating that technology allows lawyers the 
freedom to perform their duties from any physical location); Wald, supra note 12, at 495 
(“[T]echnological advances have revolutionized the practice of law, making it much 
easier to practice law nationally, from research tools that make studying law and 
gaining competence nationally quick, easy, and relatively cheap, to advances that allow 
lawyers to be virtually present everywhere.”). 
213 . See Gillers, supra note 8, at 972–78 (discussing the different ways that 
attorneys use technology to work far from their physical office, or without one at all); 
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Thus, proponents argue that the gap between state-based 
regulation and current practice makes ethical rules less relevant, 
less predictable, and less able to protect clients.214 Furthermore, 
the rules vary by state, presumably leaving many attorneys 
confused about their ethical responsibilities and enforcement 
bodies unsure about their role.215 This, it is argued, imposes 
costs on clients and undermines their ability to feel confident in 
their lawyers’ representation.216 Thus, those in favor of reform 
argue that the ABA must recognize the problems associated with 
state-based regulation and work to reconcile rules with reality.217 
Another way many proponents support their position is by 
looking to the benefits of the EU system.218 A 2012 review of the 
EU’s Lawyers’ Establishment Directive (the “EU Report”) noted 
an overall improvement in client service with the ability of 
lawyers to cross borders, with mobility contributing to the 
experience of many clients.219 Regarding the competence issues 
                                                                                                             
Kimbro, supra note 207, at 2 (stating that some state bars maintain outdated rules and 
regulations pertaining to the practice of law that may hinder their effectiveness). 
214. Wald, supra note 12, at 502 (“A regulatory approach that formally purports 
to adopt a state-based approach but in fact permits national law practice is illegitimate, 
confusing, and unpredictable.”); Zacharias, supra note 196, at 344 (advocating for 
reform based on the view that the current ethical rules have lost their effectiveness). 
215. Wald, supra note 12, at 493 (explaining that state codes often subject lawyers 
to conflicting rules); Zacharias, supra note 196, at 341 (“The rules governing 
professional conduct in the various state and federal jurisdictions have become 
irreconcilably diverse.”). 
216. Wald, supra note 12, at 511 (stating that clients end up paying for legal 
services that are less effective than they could be under a national system); Zacharias, 
supra note 196, at 344 (explaining the importance of suitable regulation for “the 
provision of guidance to lawyers and the maintenance of a public image that fosters 
client trust and thereby improves service to clients”). 
217. Wald, supra note 12, at 501 (“[T]he regulatory approach ought to be 
reconsidered and realigned with practice realities or risks becoming of little relevance 
to practicing attorneys.”); Zacharias, supra note 196, at 344 (calling for re-evaluation of 
rules where regulation no longer serves its goals). 
218. See Motion Admission Paper, supra note 121 (stating the importance of 
regulatory reforms abroad to the study of whether to amend MJP rules in the United 
States); Goebel, supra note 10, at 340 (“[F]rom the point of view of promoting the 
societal interest in achieving economic efficiency in the marketplace, the liberalization 
of interstate legal services in the European Union is vastly preferable to the 
fragmentation produced by much of the United States’ case law.”). 
219. See EU REPORT, supra note 1, at 13 (“[I]n general, the legal framework has 
provided the conditions under which cross-border needs of clients can be met . . . .”); 
Conference, A Single Market for Lawyers: valuing achievements, tackling remaining 
challenges, Draft Programme, available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/
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associated with allowing free movement of lawyers among 
Member States, the report states that lack of competence seems 
to be a problem only in new Member States.220 Thus, the reform 
movement in the United States will likely continue to draw 
inspiration from this positive experience abroad, especially as 
clients seek out the benefits associated with ALPS.221 
2. Allowing Multijurisdictional Practice in the United States Will 
Erode the Profession’s Traditional Values 
The main argument proffered by those who oppose MJP in 
the United States is that clients will suffer a disservice where 
their attorney has not obtained qualification in the Host State. 
The rule is meant to protect consumers, who may not be in a 
position to analyze their lawyer’s ability to represent them.222 
The idea is that a lawyer from out-of-state will not be competent 
in the laws of the jurisdiction.223 Conversely, a client will feel 
confident in the ability of an attorney who has passed the bar in 
that state.224 A similar worry is that the lawyer will fail to follow 
                                                                                                             
conferences/2013/1028-a-single-market-for-lawyers/docs/programme_en.pdf 
(explaining that the EU framework has been largely successful). 
220. See EU REPORT, supra note 1, at 7 (explaining that foreign lawyers are 
sufficiently competent in all but the newest Member States). But see COPENHAGEN 
REPORT, supra note 152 (criticizing deregulation that compromises core values). 
221. See MDP Market Approach, supra note 209, at 124 (“[If clients can’t find 
multidisciplinary services in the United States, the practice of] sending international 
legal business abroad because they find that the European MDP delivers higher quality 
services . . . will continue.”); Paton, supra note 4, at 2194–95 (discussing the ABA’s 
focus on the positive and negative effects of ALPS throughout the world). 
222. See Goebel, supra note 10, at 334 (discussing the need to protect consumers 
from legal representation that is incompetent or unethical); Wald, supra note 12, at 
525-26 (“Based on the assumptions that many clients seek legal advice when they are 
vulnerable, and that often clients are not in a position to evaluate the quality of legal 
services they receive, state-based regulation is meant to protect clients from predatory 
conduct . . . .”). 
223. Goebel, supra note 10, at 342 (“[R]estrictions reflect a concern that the out-
of-state lawyer’s lack of training or knowledge in the local substantive law might harm 
the client at some point . . . .”); Pamela A. McManus, Have Law License; Will Travel 15 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 527, 535 (2002) (explaining that state bars want to retain their 
ability to require a license to practice in their state so that they can ensure competent 
lawyering). 
224. McManus, supra note 223, at 534 (“Initial licensing requirements may be an 
ideal method for states to ensure that only qualified individuals receive a law license”); 
Wald, supra note 12, at 526 (explaining that reallocating regulatory control 
compromises states’ interests in protecting their citizens from harm). 
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the ethical rules of the state due to confusion about differing 
local rules or the state’s lack of control over the lawyer.225 
Other arguments focus on the right and ability of state bars 
to regulate attorneys in relation to national regulation.226 States 
assert that they have an interest in ensuring access to legal 
services, which they achieve through retaining control of the 
profession within their borders. 227  Furthermore, states and 
reform opponents argue, adherence to federalism weighs in 
favor of state control of lawyer regulation because it is not a 
power delegated to the Federal Government.228 
3. Solutions Proposed by Advocates of Multijurisdictional 
Practice Reform 
Although many attorneys agree on the need for reform, 
their preferred way to achieve it varies. 229  Some suggest a 
national system, eschewing separate state regulation in favor of a 
federal system whereby US attorneys can practice throughout 
the United States.230 This would mean assigning responsibilities 
like standards for admission to the legal profession, legal ethics 
                                                                                                             
225. Wolfram, supra note 112, at 1038 (explaining that, in general, state bars 
cannot discipline lawyers who do not have a license to practice in that state); Zacharias, 
supra note 196, at 352-53 (“[T]he splintering of regulation undermines a national 
practitioner’s ability to find guidance.”). 
226. See Goldfarb v. State Bar of Va., 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975) (recognizing the 
state’s interest in regulating lawyers); Wald, supra note 12, at 524 (recognizing that 
states have a “legitimate interest” in regulating their own lawyers to exert control over 
the profession and prevent harm to consumers).. 
227. Wald, supra note 12, at 526 (“States have a legitimate interest in ensuring 
that their citizens have access to legal services, and state-based regulation, at least in 
theory, allows them to pursue this goal.”); cf. Carole Silver, What We Don’t Know Can 
Hurt Us: The Need for Empirical Research in Regulating Lawyers and Legal Services in the 
Global Economy, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1009, 1016 n.19 (2010) (explaining how nationalizing 
regulation could shift power from state bars to national law firms). 
228. See Hazard, supra note 20, at 1177 (discussing state “conflicts with the federal 
government over certain aspects of . . . regulatory authority”); Wald, supra note 12, at 
528 (explaining that shifting towards a national system necessarily entails states ceding 
power to the federal government). 
229. See, e.g., Gillers, supra note 8, at 999 (proposing the creation of a uniform bar 
exam with separate state scoring); Wald, supra note 12, at 546 (calling for “an open 
border permission to practice subject to continued state control over admission, 
licensing, and disciplinary enforcement”).  
230. Wald, supra note 12, at 522–31 (summarizing the arguments in favor of and 
against national regulation); Zacharias, supra note 196, at 371 (describing the arguable 
benefits of enacting a national code and allowing the federal government to assume 
enforcement responsibility). 
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code drafting, and regulatory enforcement to the federal 
government.231 
More moderate approaches focus on how to improve the 
current system, such as amending Model Rule 5.5 to follow 
Colorado’s approach. 232  Other suggestions attack rules that 
could pose complications or risks to a hypothetical system of 
national regulation.233 Suggestions include homogenizing key 
ethical rules, such as the advertising regulations that now vary 
widely among jurisdictions, or requiring that all lawyers obtain 
malpractice insurance.234 
B. Alternative Legal Practice Structures: Law Firms Looking to the 
Future, or Abandonment of Professional Standards? 
The US legal profession has long considered the possible 
advantages of practicing in ALPS and the ways in which their 
implementation can solve problems plaguing the profession.235 
Although the ABA decided not to recommend any such change 
during the 20/20 Commission, and the House of Delegates 
rejected both earlier proposals, many attorneys continue to 
advocate for ALPS.236 
                                                                                                             
231. Wald, supra note 12, at 514–31 (explaining the responsibilities that would 
shift to the federal government under a national regulatory scheme); Zacharias, supra 
note 196, at 382 (discussing the national nature of “aspects of professional regulation 
that reflect great disparity”). 
232. See supra notes 173–76 and accompanying text. 
233. See Am. Bar Ass’n, Differences between State Advertising and Solicitation Rules and 
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, (May 1, 2013), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_
responsibility/state_advertising_and_solicitation_rule_differences_update_for_
virginia_july_1_2013.authcheckdam.pdf (listing how state rules diverge from the Model 
Rules); Edward Poll, Law Practice Today, Risky Business—Some Thoughts on Legal 
Malpractice Insurance, AM. BAR ASS’N, L. PRACTICE MGMT. SEC., (Feb. 2007), http://
apps.americanbar.org/lpm/lpt/articles/mtt02071.shtml (discussing Oregon’s 
requirement that all lawyers carry malpractice insurance). 
234. Gillers, supra note 8, at 1003 (explaining how harmonization of disclosure 
requirements and minimum standards would simplify the complicated system of 
attorney advertising rules); id. at 1004 (“[R]equiring malpractice insurance . . . would 
ensure payment of malpractice judgments up to the limit of the lawyer’s policy and 
compliance with the preventive measures that insurance carriers require.”). 
235. Schneyer, supra note 13, at 102–09 (summarizing the ABA debates on ALPS 
prior to the 20/20 commission); Adams & Matheson, supra note 124, at 8 (describing 
the 1983 Kutak convention on multidisciplinary practice). 
236. See generally Schneyer, supra note 13 (describing the reasons the ABA should 
have amended Model Rule 5.4 during the 20/20 Commission); Gillers, supra note 8, 
2014] LEARNING FROM EU LIBERALIZATION 1621 
As discussed above, EU Member States may permit or 
prohibit partnerships between lawyers and non-lawyers, and 
some states have therefore implemented multidisciplinary 
partnerships and non-lawyer ownerships. 237  In contrast, fee 
sharing between lawyers and non-lawyers in the United States is 
limited to Washington, D.C.238 While many US lawyers staunchly 
argue that this prohibition should remain, others vehemently 
advocate that US lawyers should be able to practice with non-
lawyers. Part I.B.1 of this Note provides the arguments for 
implementing ALPS. Part II.B.2 explains the position of those 
who oppose any change to the prohibition on ALPS, and Part 
II.B.3 summarizes some common counter-arguments to that 
position. Finally, Part II.B.4 describes of some solutions 
proposed by those who push for ALPS in the United States. 
1. Alternative Legal Practice Structures Will Meet Client Needs 
and Create a More Efficient Market for Legal Services 
The most common arguments for relaxing or removing the 
ban on ALPS are that law firms offering more than just legal 
services will better meet client interests, that they will conserve 
resources and promote efficiency, and that they will allow US 
law firms to compete in the global market. 239  Those who 
advocate for change state that accepting the existence of new 
ways to practice law does not necessitate renouncing treasured 
ethical principles. 240  Instead, they simply call for revised 
applications, which will regulate in a way that is neither over- 
nor under-inclusive, but tailored to the state of the profession 
today.241 This section summarizes the economic arguments for 
                                                                                                             
(analyzing the benefits of abandoning outdated values and embracing practice 
structures that would better the profession). 
237. See supra notes 142–63 and accompanying text. 
238. See supra notes 164–88 and accompanying text. 
239. See Paton, supra note 4, at 2196 (assessing the MDP debate “in the face of new 
global realities facing the legal profession”). See generally MDP Market Approach, supra 
note 209(explaining the economic benefits of MDP). 
240. See Gillers, supra note 8, at 998 (clarifying that by advocating the elimination 
of prohibitions on ALPS, the author does not express a desire to reduce control over the 
profession, but recognizes the need for new rules in light of practical changes); 
Mullerat, supra note 156, at 492 (“The challenge for lawyers at the turn of the twenty-
first century is this: how to reconcile current demands to operate efficiently and 
profitably with the maintaining of professional values.”). 
241. Gillers, supra note 8, at 998; Mullerat, supra note 156, at 492.  
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reform, as well as those arguments emphasizing that the 
prohibition of ALPS merely leaves attorneys who claim not to be 
practicing law outside of legal regulation. It also describes how 
ALPS proponents use the successful implementation of ALPS 
abroad to advocate for US reform. 
Those advocating for the adoption of ALPS in the United 
States often argue its necessity based on economic principles, 
including achieving client demand.242 One argument is that 
refusing to allow any sort of alternative structure disservices the 
US legal profession because it ignores client preferences and 
puts US law firms at a disadvantage in the global market.243 
Another is that the categorical ban on alternative legal practice 
structures makes regulating the ways lawyers and non-lawyers 
work together in reality difficult and encourages creative 
structures that compete with law firms. 244  Furthermore, a 
combination of technological innovation, increasingly global 
trade and access to information, and the modern economic 
climate, has caused a shift in what clients want and expect—
meaning outdated rules stand in the way of what many clients 
look for, causing them to take their business elsewhere.245 In 
contrast, allowing the implementation of ALPS would mean 
                                                                                                             
242. Adams & Matheson, supra note 124, at 1 (“The sixty-plus-year-old prohibition 
[on nonlawyer investment in law firms] has created an inefficient legal services 
market.”); MDP Market Approach, supra note 209, at 118–20 (identifying benefits of 
MDPs, such as better service for clients with both legal and non-legal needs, and saved 
time and money due to reduced efficiency costs). 
243. MDP Market Approach, supra note 209, at 205 (stating that if the profession 
does not embrace regulatory changes, US lawyers will lose their ability to compete in 
the global market); Adams & Matheson, supra note 124, at 40 (“[A]s the practice of law 
continues to be increasingly transformed from a profession into a business, it makes 
little sense to prevent lawyers from using the financial tools that virtually every other 
business has available to it.”). 
244. See Peterson, supra note 209, at 43 (“Non-law firms are gaining momentum 
and are eroding law firm revenues and profits.”); cf. Gillers, supra note 8, at 984 
(describing the different non-law firm structures that evade regulation). 
245. MDP Market Approach, supra note 209, at 88 (explaining that the ABA 
studied ALPS because many members of the profession believe clients will take their 
business abroad if they cannot obtain multidisciplinary services at home); Ethics 20/20 
Preliminary Outline, supra note 15, at 6 (discussing the importance of “permitting U.S. 
lawyers and law firms to participate on a level playing field in a global legal services 
marketplace that includes the increased use of one or more forms of alternative 
business structures”). 
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more business kept within US law firms, rather than sent abroad 
or to more flexible entities.246 
Proponents of ALPS claim that this change would help 
alleviate financial burdens on law firms, leading to beneficial 
expansion, financial stability, and better client service.247 During 
the 2008-2009 economic downturn in the United States, law 
firms’ excessive borrowing to fund expansion and salaries 
contributed to financial instability and diminished quality of 
service.248 Proponents argue that it is therefore unsurprising 
that clients in the United States desire practice models that can 
better serve their needs. 249  Thus, the argument is that 
implementation of alternative structures would meet client 
expectations as well as create a more efficient market.250 
Additionally, some proponents justify implementing reform 
on the theory that bringing non-lawyers into the legal 
profession’s regulatory fold is a better option than incurring the 
costs of trying to regulate those who do not abide by the rules or 
                                                                                                             
246. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 124, at 40 (stating that, considering “the 
substantial benefits of allowing law firms to incorporate, to engage in business 
associations with nonlawyers, and to receive investments by nonlawyers,” there are 
strong reasons to implement reform); MDP Market Approach, supra note 209, at 123–
24 (stating that U.S. clients want multidisciplinary services and will seek them outside of 
US law firms if necessary). 
247 . Adams & Matheson, supra note 124, at 40 (discussing the “capital for 
expansion, capital for investment in new technologies and new lawyers, financing for 
contingency fee cases, and a myriad of other rewards” that allowing ALPS would bring 
to US law firms); MDP Market Approach, supra note 209, at 118 (explaining that MDPs 
are more efficient, meaning law firms would save time and money while providing 
clients better service). 
248. See Paton, supra note 4, at 2199–200 (“Together, the challenge of the 
economic downturn in 2008-2009, and the changed global legal practice environment 
that the ABA’s Ethics 20/20 Commission is charged with assessing, mandate a . . . 
reconsideration of the place of the MDP in America.”); cf. April ABS Paper, supra note 
131 (citing the changed environment in which small and large law firms compete as a 
factor favoring allowing ALPS). 
249. See Randall S. Thomas et al., Megafirms, 80 N.C. L. REV. 115, 172 (2001) 
(“Increases in the number of international mergers and acquisitions and other 
complex business transactions have led clients to seek out more efficient ways of 
obtaining professional services.”); MDP Report 2000, supra note 129, at 17 (stating that 
evidence suggests clients are interested in obtaining services from MDPs). 
250.  Thomas et al., supra note 249, at 172 (“[Client] demand for MDPs is driven 
by the clients’ sense that these arrangements would be a more efficient, less costly way 
for them to deal with complex matters that have legal, accounting, and management 
issues.”); Gillers, supra note 8, at 999 (explaining that, on this view, failing to embrace 
ALPS in the face of modern circumstances hurts those values more than it preserves 
them). 
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allowing attorneys to abdicate from law firms.251 They point out 
that attorneys incentivized to take their skills outside of law 
firms, such as tax attorneys at accounting firms, are not 
regulated as lawyers. 252  Accounting firms have shown great 
interest in recruiting lawyers, based upon client demand for 
combined tax and legal services and the desire of accounting 
firms to expand internally.253 Lawyers have responded by joining 
these firms. 254  Thus, critics argue, the legal profession is 
regulating fewer and fewer professionals in the name of 
protecting core values that are actually harmed by the status 
quo.255 
Finally, proponents of implementing ALPS look to 
countries that allow non-lawyer ownership or MDP, and there is 
much scholarship about the positive effects of ALPS on clients’ 
and lawyers’ interests. 256  In Australia, where law firms may 
become public corporations, the client experience as well as the 
                                                                                                             
251. Gillers, supra note 8, at 999 (explaining that allowing professionals to leave 
the legal regulatory fold leads to less regulation); MDP Market Approach, supra note 
209, at 111 (“[A] client will often need non-tax services to implement . . . [a] tax plan 
. . . [such as] transferring title to a property, or drafting the documents for a family 
limited partnership. Providing these services could arguably constitute the 
unauthorized practice of law.”). 
252. Thomas et al., supra note 249, at 173 (explaining that lawyers working 
outside of law firms may avoid application of the legal profession’s regulations so long 
as they do not appear in court, which many types of lawyers never do); Green, supra 
note 17, at 1117 (stating that the ethical rules apply “when lawyers practice law”). 
253.  Thomas et al., supra note 249, at 172 (“Clients’ demands have . . . [caused 
accounting firms] to build up their internal legal groups.”); MDP Market approach, 
supra note 209, at 104 (explaining that where “accounting firms have expanded their 
consulting practices” they will recruit lawyers). 
254. See Gillers, supra note 8, at 991–92 (“Tax lawyers have long been willing, if the 
incentives are strong, to take their skills to accounting firms.”); Thomas et al., supra 
note 249, at 173 (stating that accounting firms aggressively pursue tax partners from 
major law firms).  
255. Gillers, supra note 8, at 999 (arguing that the profession has a responsibility 
to implement changes that would improve access to legal services without 
compromising core values); Schneyer, supra note 13, at 136 (explaining that allowing 
more lawyers to embrace partnerships with non-lawyers outside the law firm context 
will cause the profession to miss “the opportunity to learn from experience which, if 
any, forms of nonlawyer ownership cause problems and how best to regulate firms with 
nonlawyer owners”). 
256. See MDP Market Approach, supra note 209, at 114 (“The Swiss economy, 
which is dominated by the banking industry, has long recognized the value of decisions 
informed by many different professionals.”); Terry, supra note 7, at 1599 (reporting 
that German lawyers indicated in interviews that their clients want and benefit from 
multidisciplinary services). 
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achievement of law firm goals appear to point in favor of 
incorporated legal practices.257 And although ALPS are new in 
the United Kingdom, early studies report better client service 
and increased market share.258 
One field of study emphasizes that the ethical concerns 
cited by opponents of ALPS may be less relevant or inevitable 
than anti-reform scholarship presents.259 Proponents emphasize 
that lawyers practicing with non-lawyers in Germany, where 
MDPs have long been allowed, have not sacrificed their ethical 
standards.260 Thus, as ALPS continue to take hold abroad, they 
may serve to push reform in the United States.261 
2. Alternative Legal Practice Structures Threaten to Make Legal 
Practice Just Another Business and Erode Lawyers’ Core Values 
Opposition to allowing ALPS reflects a concern that any 
change in ownership structure would erode the “core values” of 
the legal profession. 262  The steadfast opposition to 
                                                                                                             
257. See Andrew Grech & Kirsten Morrison, Slater & Gordon: The Listing Experience, 
22 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 535, 540 (2009) (“The Slater & Gordon experience has shown 
that an IPO can be an effective strategy.”); Laurel S. Terry, Transnational Legal Practice 
(International), 47 INT’L LAW. 485, 496 (2013) (summarizing a study that found that 
Australian law firms that have incorporated receive less complaints). 
258 . LEGAL SERVICES BOARD, EVALUATION: CHANGES IN COMPETITION IN 
DIFFERENT LEGAL MARKETS (2013) (explaining that UK law firms embracing ALPS are 
starting to positively impact client experience and that new structures have increased 
market share); Julius Melnitzer, Alternative Business Structures More Productive Than Law 
Firms, U.K. Regulator Finds, FIN. POST (Oct. 24, 2013), http://business.
financialpost.com/2013/10/24/alternative-business-structures-more-productive-than-
law-firms-u-k-regulator-finds/ (reporting that the Legal Services Board found ALPS 
more productive than law firms and more adept at complaint management). 
259. See Mullerat, supra note 156, at 488 (“[Germany’s MDPs] do not seem to 
have shown any of the problems now being discussed such as protection of 
independence, confidentiality, and avoidance of conflicts.”); Terry, supra note 257, at 
496 (explaining that, with the help of the “appropriate managing systems” 
requirement, Australia has successfully worked toward the elimination of ethical 
concerns with public law firms). 
260. Terry, supra note 7, at 1623 (summarizing Germany’s positive experience 
with multidisciplinary practice); Mullerat, supra note 156, at 488 (explaining that 
lawyers practicing in Germany’s MDPs have not lost their ethical values). 
261. Paton, supra note 4, at 2194 (explaining how developments abroad brought 
about the possibility that the idea of alternative business structures may “have new life 
in America”); Gillers, supra note 8, at 998 (opining that the idea of alternative business 
structures are “not a trend . . . that we can vote down”). 
262. December ALPS Paper, supra note 4, at 2 (discussing “whether such practices 
could operate in a manner that is consistent with the American legal profession’s core 
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organizational reform is based on the fear that sharing 
ownership with non-lawyers will erode lawyers’ confidentiality, 
loyalty, candor, and diligence.263 The argument is that mixing 
lawyers with non-lawyers who recognize different values 
threatens legal professionalism, causes ethical concerns, and 
ultimately, may undercut the dignity of the profession.264 
Opposition to changes in the regulation of the legal 
profession is often supported by the long-standing, principle 
differences in separating attorneys from other professionals and 
holding lawyers to higher ethical standards.265 This argument 
highlights the unique attributes of the legal profession, such as 
the lawyer-client confidentiality relationship and the lawyer’s 
role as a zealous advocate, as necessitating unique ethical 
rules.266 
Another oft-cited reason to oppose reform is that allowing 
non-lawyer ownership and MDP will cause law to become just 
another business, dominated by giants at the sacrifice of 
ethics.267 Allowing even limited forms of ALPS, some say, will 
                                                                                                             
values.”); see Green, supra note 17, at 1117 (2000) (“[T]hose who oppose 
multidisciplinary practice rally under the banner of core values.”). 
263. See Gillers, supra note 8, at 998 (“[Opponents of ALPS believe that] if we do 
anything that recognizes these changes, we afford a patina of legitimacy at the expense 
of the American legal profession’s core values: confidentiality, loyalty, candor, and 
diligence.”); Paton, supra note 4, at 2198 (explaining that lawyers who oppose ALPS 
claim that embracing new structures will threaten the core values of the profession). 
264. Gillers, supra note 8, at 987 (“If powerful nonlawyers in law firms are 
positioned to influence the compensation and status of firm lawyers, they may cause 
the lawyers to violate ethical obligations if they believe͒that doing so will enhance the 
finances of the firm and therefore their own.”); Green, supra note 17, at 1146 (stating 
that the argument against ALPS assumes that proper lawyer-client relationships can 
exist only if lawyers are regulated by special professional standards). 
265. See Goldfarb v. State Bar of Va., 421 U.S. 773, 786–87 (1975) (describing the 
Bar’s argument that lawyers, as members of a “learned profession,” are different than 
other tradespeople and thus should not be subject to the same rules); Gillers, supra 
note 8, at 987 (“[N]on-lawyers are not governed by legal ethics rules, do not have to 
worry about professional discipline, and might be quite willing to violate duties to 
clients, courts, or others in order to enrich themselves . . . .”). 
266. See Green, supra note 17, at 1147 (“[L]awyers’ client-centered duties, such as 
the duties of loyalty and zealous advocacy, are thought to be incompatible with 
accountants’ public-regarding ethos . . . .”); Schneyer, supra note 13, at 131 (describing 
the threat to confidentiality that opponents of ALPS connect with associations among 
lawyers and non-lawyers). 
267. Adams & Matheson, supra note 124, at 15–16 (“[Opponents of ALPS] fear 
that nonlawyers in management will exert control over a lawyer’s actions, forcing 
decisions that are best for the organization’s business, rather than decisions that the 
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lead down a “slippery slope.”268 Opponents furthermore dismiss 
the positive effects of ALPS on competition, claiming they are 
irrelevant because competition is foreign to the legal 
profession.269 
3. Progressive Responses to Opposing Arguments 
The concerns voiced by opponents of ALPS are not 
discounted by pro-reform scholarship; it is the argument itself 
that has come under fire, causing proponents to question 
whether the professionalism argument continues to deserve its 
prominent place, or rather any place at all, in this contemporary 
ethical debate.270 Pro-reform commentary focuses largely on the 
relative unimportance of these arguments compared with the 
advantages of ALPS. 271  Furthermore, proponents cite the 
options available to avoid the feared consequences of allowing 
non-lawyer ownership and MDP.272  
                                                                                                             
lawyer knows are best for the client.”); Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of 
Law: Does the One Who Has the Gold Really Make the Rules? 40 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 605–06 
(1989) (explaining that allowing non-lawyers to own and manage law firms will lead to 
lawyers losing control over their practice). 
268. See Schneyer, supra note 13, at 129 (“The opponents’ comments invoke the 
slippery slope theory to argue that, even if adopting the Working Group’s proposal 
would not be objectionable in itself, it would allow the proverbial camel to get its nose 
under the professional tent.”); see, e.g., Letter from Douglas R. Richmond to ABA 
Comm’n on Ethics 20/20 (Jan. 6, 2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/ethics_20_20_comments/richmond_
alpsdiscussiondraft.authcheckdam.pdf (opposing amendments to Model Rule 5.4 
because of a belief that later, more dramatic changes will follow and cause harm to the 
profession). 
269. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz. 433 U.S. 350, 368 (1977) (summarizing the bar’s 
argument that advertising legal services would lead to a competitive marketplace and, 
therefore, the erosion of legal ethics); Schneyer, supra note 13, at 133 (“[P]romoting 
competition in legal services, far from being a core value of the American legal 
profession, has been a negative value.”). 
270. See Paton, supra note 4, at 2198 (discussing the need “to reconsider whether 
‘core values’ rhetoric needs to be viewed through a new lens and new forms of business 
models including the MDP need to be permitted”); Schneyer, supra note 13, at 135 
(explaining that resort to professionalism rhetoric has negative effects on the 
profession). 
271. Schneyer, supra note 13, at 92–93 (analogizing the prohibition of ALPS to 
restrictions on attorney advertising by analyzing the weight of ethical concerns 
compared with other effects); Wald, supra note 12, at 501 (explaining that arguments 
based on “tradition, historical-path dependencies, and aversion to change” are 
insufficient, even if they are not incorrect). 
272. See Schneyer, supra note 13, at 1001–02 (proposing safeguards that would 
reduce the risks associated with allowing formation of attorney-client relations on the 
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The importance of professionalism concerns is difficult to 
quantify, so those advocating reform state that resorting to these 
arguments may stifle debate and analysis.273 Many attorneys 
argue that reliance on such subjective arguments, combined 
with a lack of empirical evidence, leads to weak discourse that 
may raise questions about the ABA’s ability to regulate the legal 
profession. 274  Finally, proponents of reform state that 
categorical bans imposed based upon professionalism concerns 
are vulnerable to external attack and possibly invalidation.275 
4. Solutions Proposed by Advocates for Alternative Legal 
Practice Structures 
Those who advocate for ALPS call for an amendment to 
Model Rule 5.4 that would allow some forms of fee sharing 
between lawyers and non-lawyers to exist in the United States.276 
The 20/20 Commission indicated that the adoption of 
legislation allowing ALPS abroad prompted the need for 
research on whether to implement these ALPS in the United 
States.277 The ABA expressed concerns about being edged out 
                                                                                                             
internet, such as subjecting lawyers to “the disciplinary and judicial authority” of the 
jurisdiction entered virtually to hold them accountable); December ALPS Paper, supra 
note 4, at 12–13 (proposing a character assessment for non-lawyer owners as a way to 
eliminate the fear that non-lawyers will cause lawyers to violate their ethical duties). 
273. See Schneyer, supra note 13, at 135 (“[I]diom-based arguments, which are 
value-laden but often devoid of factual support, may well be displacing more difficult, 
evidence-based assessments of the risks and benefits, or the likely impact, of a proposed 
rule . . . .”); Paton, supra note 4, at 2198 (explaining how this argument, repeated 
throughout time, causes dissension within the profession). 
274. See THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 68–69 (2010) 
(denouncing the efforts to achieve professionalism as little more than “hollow 
phrases”); Schneyer, supra note 13, at 135–36 (explaining that rhetorical arguments 
can create “doubts that the bar can make appropriate rules on such subjects”). 
275. Schneyer, supra note 13, at 136 (“[I]t is no longer fanciful to suppose that 
categorical bans on [non-lawyer] ownership will be struck down on constitutional 
grounds in the foreseeable future, or that state legislatures will try to override the bans 
by statute.”); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 368–72 (1977) (holding that 
categorical bans on advertising violate the First Amendment). 
276. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 124, at 3 (advocating for change by 
discussing the potential benefits of allowing law firms to incorporate, to engage in 
business associations with nonlawyers, and to receive investments from nonlawyers); 
Paton, supra note 4, at 2242–43 (arguing that the ABA should implement ALPS). 
277. See Schneyer, supra note 13, at 76 (explaining that the ABA studied the topic 
to see if changes were called for in light of the globalization of law practice and 
technological developments); December ALPS Paper, supra note 4, at 7 (“The Working 
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of the global marketplace, confusion about handling 
collaboration with lawyers who partner with non-lawyers, and a 
desire to use alternative legal practice structures to help foster 
the provision of affordable legal services to those in need.278 
These motivations caused the ABA to seriously consider some of 
the forms of non-lawyer ownership that have been implemented 
abroad.279  The least restrictive form of ALPS that the ABA 
considered would allow lawyers to freely partner, and share fees, 
with other professionals practicing in their own field. 280 
However, more regulated variations include restrictions such as 
requiring that the firm only practice law (the D.C. model), that 
the non-lawyer ownership be limited to a certain percentage, 
and that all non-lawyer owners pass a character test, as they must 
in the United Kingdom.281 Another option is to allow non-
lawyers to invest capital in law firms but not let them have an 
active position in the firm.282 
                                                                                                             
Group also studied ALPS models adopted abroad, because U.S. lawyers and law firms 
are increasingly operating in markets where such models are permitted.”). 
278. See April ABS Paper, supra note 131, at 1 (suggesting a connection between 
ALPS and the ability of US lawyers to compete in the global market); December ALPS 
Paper, supra note 4, at 1 (discussing the possibility that ALPS would allow lawyers to 
provide clients improved access to justice and better quality representation). 
279. Schneyer, supra note 13, at 78 (explaining that the ABA asked the ALPS 
Working Group to consider ALPS in light of reforms abroad); April ABS Paper, supra 
note 131, at 1 (“[T]he Commission formed a Working Group that has been studying 
the impact of domestic and international developments [regarding how] core 
principles of client and public protection [can] be satisfied while simultaneously 
permitting U.S. lawyers and law firms to participate on a level playing field in a global 
legal services marketplace that includes the increased use of one or more forms of 
alternative business structures.”). 
280. April ABS Paper, supra note 131, at 19 (describing this option and identifying 
it as the Australian model); Schneyer, supra note 13, at 79 (explaining that these firms 
“have lawyer- and nonlawyer-owners who are all active in firm operations, with the 
nonlawyers providing nonlegal services to their own clients”). 
281. April ABS Paper, supra note 131, at 17–19 (providing an explanation of how 
these restrictions fit into the options); Schneyer, supra note 13, at 80–81 (“[The ABA 
considered] a version of Rule 5.4 that would follow the District of Columbia model, but 
with two further restrictions: a percentage cap on non-lawyer ownership in order to 
maintain lawyer control, and a requirement that the law partners conduct a character 
inquiry to assess the capacity of prospective non-lawyer owners to act in a manner 
compatible with the lawyers’ duties.”). 
282. April ABS Paper, supra note 131, at 19 (“An alternative would be to permit 
non-lawyer passive investment in such entities.”); Schneyer, supra note 13, at 79 
(explaining that one form of ALPS are firms owned, in whole or in part, by passive 
investors). 
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III. GRADUALLY LIFTING OVERLY RESTRICTIVE RULES 
WHILE IMPLEMENTING SAFEGUARDS TO UPHOLD THE 
PROFESSION’S TRADITIONS AND HIGH ETHICAL 
STANDARDS ACHIEVES A PROPER BALANCE OF 
FUNDAMENTAL VALUES AND PROGRESS 
As technological innovation and globalization continue to 
shift consumer and societal needs and expectations, reform of 
the professional legal standards are necessary to keep pace with 
everyday realities of the profession.283 The issue thus becomes: 
how much change the profession can handle before it is 
unrecognizable, and how much change is right for key 
stakeholders in the market for legal services?284 
Attorneys in the United States are protective of the self-
regulating nature of the profession, and this attitude can stall 
debate and, ultimately, progress.285 Applied to MJP and ALPS, 
this analysis weighs in favor of moderate reform that will 
gradually improve the “fit” between regulation and modern 
realities of practice.286 Part III.A of this Note proposes and 
defends amendments to the Model Rules that would facilitate 
MJP. Part III.B discusses the benefits of replacing the categorical 
ban on ALPS with a rule allowing lawyers to practice with non-
lawyers, subject to safeguards and restrictions. 
                                                                                                             
283. See Goldsmith, supra note 50, at 444 (“The globalisation of ideas . . . means 
that our societies around the world are becoming more like each other.”). See generally 
Terry, supra note 257 (describing the many relevant recent reforms). 
284. Gillers, supra note 8, at 1022 (“Reasonable people will disagree on when and 
how the profession and the courts should react to [the] gap [between practice and 
reality]. But doing nothing is not an option.”); Goldsmith, supra note 50, at 453 
(discussing the “need to show that the values of our profession are consistent with the 
modern governing ideology”). 
285. See Green, supra note 17, at 1146 (describing the repetitive nature of the “core 
values” argument); Schneyer, supra note 13, at 135–36 (explaining the negative effects 
of repetitive arguments amongst attorneys). 
286. See Goebel, supra note 10, at 340 (“In the United States, despite the fact that 
modern interstate transactional practice is increasingly important and common, there 
exists no solid doctrinal view permitting such practice.”). See generally Wald, supra note 
12 (describing the “gap” between practice and reality). 
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A. Separating Temporary Practice, Permanent Establishment, and Bar 
Admission to Allow Appropriate Forms of Multijurisdictional Practice 
The European Union’s system of regulating MJP in the 
legal profession is superior to the ABA’s approach in terms of 
client interests and efficiency.287 However, liberalization of the 
US system must occur more gradually because federalism and 
tradition play an important role in the US system.288 Section 
III.A.1 proposes amendments to the Model Rules that would 
facilitate MJP in the United States. Section III.A.2 describes the 
benefits associated with separating different types of MJP. 
Finally, section III.A.3 explains other positive effects of the 
proposed amendments. 
1. Suggested Amendments to the Model Rules on 
Multijurisdictional Practice 
The best approach is a series of amendments to the Model 
Rules regarding MJP. First, Model Rule 5.5 will treat temporary 
and permanent MJP separately, although some rules will 
overlap.289 Additionally, Model Rule 5.5 will incorporate parts of 
the open-border approach in place in Colorado, but eliminate 
the restrictions on lawyers with a domicile or office in 
Colorado.290 
Furthermore, the rule will impose several additional 
safeguards to protect against the erosion of tradition and 
                                                                                                             
287. See Goebel, supra note 10, at 338 (explaining that the EU model of lawyer 
regulation provides clients with a better way to realize their interest in choosing their 
lawyer); Lonbay, supra note 1, at 1629–30 (explaining that EU lawyers are better able to 
fulfill their duties because they are not hiding their practices). 
288. See supra notes 97–101 and accompanying text. 
289 . See Lawyers’ Services Directive, supra note 30 (issued “to facilitate the 
effective exercise by lawyers of freedom to provide services”); cf. Lawyers’ Establishment 
Directive, supra note 33 (seeking “to facilitate practice of the profession of lawyer on a 
permanent basis in a Member State other than that in which the qualification was 
obtained”). 
290. Colo. R. Civ. P § 220(1) (providing the conditions for applicability of 
Colorado’s out-of-state rule); Wald, supra note 12, at 534 (“[Although requiring] an 
out-of-state attorney to be admitted in another United States jurisdiction, maintain an 
active status, and be in good standing . . . seems to be reasonably related to . . . 
ensuring quality and providing some measures of consumer protection. Using domicile 
and the establishment of a permanent office as disqualifying factors . . . seems ill 
advised.”). 
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ethics.291 It will require that multijurisdictional service providers 
obtain malpractice insurance in their Home State, similar to the 
mandatory requirement in Oregon.292  Additionally, attorneys 
practicing under this rule will be subject to the ethical rules of 
the Host State where rules conflict.293 The rule will also require 
attorneys who establish themselves on a permanent basis to 
register with the Host State, deriving support from Nevada’s 
Rule 5.5A.294  
Implementation of this rule would call for a change to the 
Model Rule on Admission on Motion, which would create a 
different framework for admission to the bar of the Host 
State. 295  This amendment will require attorneys seeking 
admission outside their Bar State to either practice in the Host 
State for at least one year or pass an aptitude test.296 
                                                                                                             
291. See supra notes 247–51 and accompanying text. 
292. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 752.035(1) (West 2014) (requiring “all qualified 
members of the profession to carry professional liability insurance offered by the fund 
with primary liability limits of at least $200,000”); Oregon State Bar, Professional 
Liability Fund (PLF), http://www.osbar.org/plf/plf.html (stating that the Professional 
Liability Fund is “the mandatory provider of primary malpractice coverage for Oregon 
lawyers”). 
293. See Wald, supra note 12, at 535 (stating that subjecting lawyers to the 
regulations of the Host State “ensures that an out-of-state lawyer could be held 
accountable . . . [and] provides an out-of-state attorney who wishes to enjoy the benefits 
of law practice in a given jurisdiction the incentive to accept the consequences of doing 
so, including the risk of discipline.”); EU REPORT, supra note 1, at 106 (suggesting, as a 
solution to the confusion caused by conflicting ethical rules, a system whereby “in case 
of conflicting rules the regulation of the host country applies”). 
294 . See NEV. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5A (West 2006) (requiring 
registration by “a lawyer who is not admitted in [Nevada], but who is admitted and in 
good standing in another jurisdiction of the United States, and who provides legal 
services for a Nevada client in connection with transactional or extra-judicial matters 
that are pending in or substantially related to Nevada.”); Wald, supra note 12, at 535 
n.180 (stating that another example of a registration provision is “the European model 
pursuant to the Lawyers Establishment Directive”). 
295. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT RULE ON ADMISSION BY MOTION 
(providing a means of obtaining admission outside of a lawyer’s home state, but only 
on a permanent basis); cf. Lawyers’ Services Directive, supra note 30; Lawyers’ 
Establishment Directive, supra note 33 (allowing European lawyers to practice either 
temporarily or permanently throughout the EU). 
296. See Diploma Recognition Directive, supra note 54 (providing for either an 
aptitude test or an adaptation period); EU REPORT, supra note 1, at 16 (stating that the 
Diploma Recognition Directive allows Member States to implement “either an 
adaptation period or an aptitude test”). 
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2. The Benefits of Separating Temporary and Permanent 
Practice and the Positive Resulting Change to the Model Rule 
on Admission by Motion 
The EU system allows three different levels of MJP: (1) 
temporary practice, (2) permanent establishment as a Home 
State lawyer, and (3) permanent establishment as a Host State 
lawyer.297 However, the current US system does not explicitly 
allow permanent MJP under Model Rule 5.5, which means US 
lawyers do not have an effective way to move their practice 
without seeking admission to a new bar.298 
Affording them this middle ground will benefit lawyers, 
who will have more options to practice virtually or physically.299 
This may be especially helpful to young lawyers who passed the 
bar in one state and got a job in another, where they plan to 
take the bar; or who need to move for personal reasons. Finally, 
it will allow states more control over attorneys practicing for 
longer periods of time.300 
This also allows the imposition of additional restrictions for 
admission by motion, which should contribute to more uniform 
implementation of the rule.301 The requirement of one years’ 
practice in the Host State is based upon the three-year 
requirement in the Lawyers’ Establishment Directive, but would 
require just one year for two reasons: (1) to avoid the EU 
phenomena of attorneys opting to practice under their home 
state title and encourage US attorneys to seek admission, 
furthering the states’ desire to control their attorneys, and (2) 
                                                                                                             
297. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
298. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
299. See supra notes 222–26 and accompanying text. 
300. See Lawyers’ Establishment Directive, supra note 33, at 37 (“[T]his Directive 
does not lay down any rules concerning purely domestic situations, and where it does 
affect national rules regulating the legal profession it does so no more than is necessary 
to achieve its purpose effectively.”); Wald, supra note 12, at 524 (“[S]tates have long 
argued that they have a legitimate interest in regulating lawyers practicing in their 
jurisdiction in order to protect their citizens and exercise control over state power.”). 
301. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT RULE ON ADMISSION BY MOTION (as 
amended August 6, 2012) (“[The ABA] urges jurisdictions that have not adopted the 
Model Rule on Admission by Motion to do so, and urges jurisdictions that have 
adopted admission by motion procedures to eliminate any restrictions that do not 
appear in the Model Rule on Admission by Motion.”); Motion Admission Paper, supra 
note 121, at 4 (“[A]pproximately thirty jurisdictions have an admission by motion 
procedure that imposes restrictions beyond those contained in the Model Rule.”). 
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because some of the differentials in practice existing in the EU, 
such as language and culture, are much less pronounced among 
US states.302 
3. Other Benefits of the Proposed Solution 
The rule described will follow Colorado’s lead in opening 
the door to MJP, but will go further by eliminating the no-
domicile and no-office requirements.303 These restrictions are 
arguably unconstitutional, and their objectives are served by 
separating temporary and permanent multijurisdictional 
practice.304 
The rule’s malpractice insurance requirement will protect 
consumers by giving them redress for unethical or uninformed 
attorneys.305 Consumers will also benefit from the Host State 
ethics rule choice because, by holding attorneys to the ethical 
standards of the Host State, the problem of confusion about 
ethical rules is ameliorated.306 This will also allow the state to 
retain control over practice within its borders.307 
B. The Benefits of Replacing the Prohibition Alternative Legal Practice 
Structures with a Restriction and the Importance of Monitoring 
Implementation 
The ABA’s categorical prohibition on ALPS is outdated, 
inefficient, and vulnerable.308 Conversely, the European Union’s 
                                                                                                             
302. See EU REPORT, supra note 1, at 7 (“[I]mportant reasons for lawyers to prefer 
the route of the Professional Qualifications Directive over that of the Establishment 
Directive are that lawyers want to integrate earlier than after three years, or that they 
did not want to establish in the host country.”); id. at 20 (explaining the client demand 
for “specific language abilities”). 
303 . See Wald, supra note 12, at 532 (explaining Colorado’s “open-border” 
approach); see supra notes 173–76 (providing an analysis of the system implemented in 
Colorado). 
304. See supra notes 101–10 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme 
Court’s invalidation of rules that discriminate or deprive lawyers of the right to practice 
law); Wald, supra note 12, at 534 (“[D]omicile and a permanent office are used as 
proxy to identify lawyers who serve clients in a particular state.”). 
305. See Poll, supra note 233 (explaining the advantages of Oregon’s malpractice 
insurance requirement); Gillers, supra note 8, at 1004 (“Few if any rules could protect 
clients as effectively as a rule requiring malpractice insurance.”). 
306. See supra notes 222–25 and accompanying text. 
307. See supra notes 226–28 and accompanying text. 
308. See supra notes 194–221 and accompanying text. 
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system, which allows Member States to prohibit ALPS but does 
not require it, allows national governments to appropriately 
harness the benefits of ALPS.309 Thus, Part III.B.1 suggests that 
the ABA should amend Model Rule 5.4 to allow limited forms of 
ALPS. Part III.B.2 describes the procedural advantages of the 
suggested approach. Part III.B.3 explains how the suggested 
amendment properly balances the interests of lawyers and 
clients alike. Finally, Part III.B.4 emphasizes that by encouraging 
reconsideration of the issue, the ABA can ensure that the 
profession will benefit. 
1. Suggested Amendment to Model Rule 5.4 
The best course of action for the ABA is to amend Model 
Rule 5.4 to allow very limited forms of ALPS, and to reconsider 
the topic in the near future.310 Specifically, the Model Rule will 
allow non-lawyer ownership of law firms, with three important 
caveats: (1) the law firm must only practice law; (2) the 
percentage of non-lawyer owners must be 25% or less; and (3) 
all non-lawyer owners must pass a character and fitness test.311 It 
will also incorporate the ABA’s position on fee sharing between 
lawyers located in jurisdictions that allow ALPS and those that 
do not.312 
2. Procedural Advantages of the Proposed Solution 
The procedures for implementing reform are vastly 
different in the European Union than in the United States.313 
                                                                                                             
309. See supra notes 256–58 and accompanying text. 
310. See Motion Admission Paper, supra note 121, at 4 (“[The next commission to 
study MJP should] reexamine the Model Rule, determine whether it has had its 
intended effect, and determine if any new efforts might be advisable in this area.”); 
supra notes 308-09 and accompanying text. 
311. See id. 
312. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 464, supra note 
184 (providing that attorneys in jurisdictions that disallow multidisciplinary fee sharing 
may share fees with lawyers in those that allow multidisciplinary fee sharing); Ethics 
20/20 Final Report, supra note 123, at 9 (explaining that confusion over “whether a 
lawyer in a jurisdiction that prohibits nonlawyer ownership of law firms and the sharing 
of legal fees with nonlawyers may divide a fee with a lawyer in a different firm in which 
such ownership or fee sharing occurs and is permitted by the Rules applicable to that 
firm” inhibits multidisciplinary practice). 
313. See supra notes 21–96 and accompanying text; cf. supra notes 97–143 and 
accompanying text. 
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The ABA provides the US legal profession with Model Rules, 
whereas the EU’s institutions provide more general guidance 
regarding the limits on national governments’ ability to 
regulate.314 
This means that the ABA must not incorporate a radical 
change, because states may choose to not implement the 
amended rule.315 However, if the ABA continues prohibiting 
ALPS, states may never implement any changes, and the debate 
will remain at a standstill.316 Thus, by amending Model Rule 5.4 
to allow a restrictive form of ALPS, the ABA opens the door for 
states to embrace progress.317 
3. Balancing Client, Lawyer, and Law firm Interests with 
Preservation of Core values 
This suggestion meets client demand for one-stop business 
services, and will lead to the efficient market envisioned by those 
advocating for reform. 318  At the same time, the three 
requirements will help ensure that the priority of law firms is 
always to practice law according to the profession’s values of 
                                                                                                             
314. See supra note 99 and accompanying text; cf. supra note 27 and accompanying 
text. 
315. See EU REPORT, supra note 1, at 205–06 (summarizing EU Member States’ 
implementation of MDP and non-lawyer ownership and showing that modest reforms 
are more often implemented than drastic changes); Motion Admission Comparison, 
supra note 165 (showing that states are reluctant to adopt the rule in full). 
316. Paton, supra note 4, at 2193 (stating that, following the House of Delegates’ 
refusal to amend Rule 5.4, “[f]or all intents and purposes, the MDP was dead, buried in 
‘core values’ rhetoric”); Schneyer, supra note 13, at 84 (explaining that “constant 
reliance over time on virtually the same rhetorical tools” inhibits progress). 
317. See Adams & Matheson, supra note 124, at 30–35 (discussing the progress law 
firms could make with outside capital, including expansion, investment in technology, 
and better hires); MDP Market Approach, supra note 209, at 90 (“A narrowly tailored 
system of regulation of MDPs will accomplish the important goals of satisfying client 
demand for multidisciplinary services while protecting the legitimate interests of the 
legal profession in preserving its core values.”).  
318. Mullerat, supra note 156, at 481 (“There are strong reasons in favor of 
allowing MDPs: they promote freedom of initiative and competition, and . . . may 
benefit the user in terms of time, cost, and efficiency.”). See generally MDP Market 
Approach, supra note 209 (describing the ways in which alternative legal practice 
structures will create an efficient market). 
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independence and commitment to client confidentiality and 
advocacy.319  
Implementing the ABA’s position on fee sharing between 
jurisdictions with different approaches to ALPS will eliminate 
confusion, allowing attorneys to provide efficient and ethical 
services to their clients.320 
4. Reconsideration as a Check on Effectiveness 
When the time comes for reconsideration, the profession 
will have the advantage of seeing how these changes worked in 
the states that implemented the Model Rule.321 Furthermore, US 
lawyers will have seen how other forms of implementing ABS 
abroad have fared. 322  This will change the rhetoric of the 
argument to ensure that debate is meaningful and progress 
occurs.323 
CONCLUSION 
The debate in the United States over whether the legal 
profession can embrace reform without compromising its core 
values is off the mark. In reality, the better question is how the 
profession can achieve this balance. This Note submits that the 
suggested amendments to the Model Rules are the way to do so. 
If the rhetoric can shift away from core values versus reform 
toward core values alongside reform, the profession is sure to 
implement the proper changes for the future. 
  
                                                                                                             
319. April ABS Paper, supra note 131, at 17 (describing the United Kingdom’s use 
of a “fit to own” test); Paton, supra note 4, at 2243 (discussing the reconciliation of 
“‘core values’ questions with new models of service delivery”). 
320. See Wald, supra note 12, at 493 (“[L]awyers who increasingly have a national 
practice find themselves subject to the conflicting regulation of several jurisdictions.”). 
See generally ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 464 (2013), 
supra note 184  (explaining that the ABA does not require lawyers to refrain from 
sharing fees with other lawyers, even if one lawyer can share fees with non-lawyers). 
321. See supra note 310; supra notes 273–75 (explaining the need for new evidence 
on the subject of MDP). 
322. See Legal Services Act 2007, supra note 157 (implementing a regulatory 
system that allows ALPS in the United Kingdom); supra notes 273–75. 
323. See Schneyer, supra note 13, at 135 (explaining that, by eliminating idiom-
based arguments from the profession’s debates, assessments of possible reform options 
based on evidence will allow the profession to achieve progress); supra notes 273–75. 
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